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VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN HEALTH CARE: 
THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
 
David C. Szostak 
 
"…innumerable regulatory actions are conclusive proof, not of effective 
regulation, but of the desire to regulate."1 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
The U.S. health care system is hopelessly fragmented.2  Health  
care providers offer services to patients in distinct venues – hospitals, out- 
patient surgery centers, physicians’ offices, drugstores, and many other 
places. In a wholly separate industry, health insurance companies finance 
this care. This dysfunctional system arose over many decades, due to the 
combination of historical accident and government policy.3 Not surpris- 
ingly, nobody knows what anything really costs – or should cost, at least, 
based on market value4 – and financial incentives encourage all kinds of 
counterproductive behavior. 
The purpose of this paper is neither to prove that the health care 
industry is fragmented and inefficient (which is obvious enough)5 nor to 
discuss its history and evolution since the early twentieth century (which 
many authors have done already).6 It is enough for our purposes to state 
upfront that the modern U.S. health care system is broken and its business 
models have thoroughly ossified. Imposing change across so many sepa- 
rate entities and industries, each with its own economic interests and moti- 
 
 
1 George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & 
ECON 1, 1 (1962). 
2 See, e.g., David Hyman, Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like Everything Else, 36 
AM J.L. & MED 370, 371-372 (2010) (referring to the existing system as “a dysfunctional non-system   that 
delivers uncoordinated care of widely varying quality at a high cost.”). 
3 See generally e.g., Thomas Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational Fragmentation in Health 
Care, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 217 (2009-2010); Karen S. Palmer, Remarks at the Meeting of the Physicians for 
a National Health Program: A Brief History: Universal Health Care Efforts in the US (Spring 1999), at 
http://www.pnhp.org/facts/a-brief-history-universal-health-care-efforts-in-the-us. 
4 E.g., Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME, Apr. 4, 2013. 
5  See note 2, supra. 
6  See note 3, supra. 
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vations, is increasingly difficult, and progress remains sclerotic.7 The nec- 
essary and inevitable solution is for a major player in the health care indus- 
try to undertake dramatic, all-encompassing vertical integration; only such 
a completely vertically integrated entity can have the necessary system- 
wide perspective and sufficient scope to get its arms around the fragmenta- 
tion and fix it, reshaping and optimizing everything from the ground up. 
Therefore, this paper generally assumes that vertical integration is desir- 
able and explores the next logical questions: Is it feasible? What are the 
legal and regulatory obstacles to integration, and are these regulations ap- 
propriate in this novel context? What would the ideal regulatory landscape 
for an integrated system look like? 
This paper will essentially consist of three large substantive sec- 
tions, all found in Part II below. As a starting point, first, Part I will define 
the term, “vertical integration” and briefly discuss the concept, as this sets 
the stage for the rest of the discussion. This section will also lay out some 
of the reasons that vertical integration is beneficial. This is not necessarily 
the thrust of the paper’s argument, but it is critical to understand before 
proceeding. Part I will make the case that an integrated payor-provider 
system, if implemented correctly, has the potential to dramatically reduce 
cost, increase quality, and increase access to care. 
Part II will explore the legal framework in existence today that any 
health care entity wishing to undertake vertical integration would need to 
carefully consider. Generally, this means state and federal law, though 
quasi-legal business considerations may be equally important and bear ex- 
amining. 
Traditionally, states have regulated the health care industry as one 
of their fundamental “police powers.”8 State legislatures typically enact an 
insurance code as well as health maintenance organization laws, and states 
generally establish departments of insurance, administrative agencies that 
are responsible for regulating and overseeing insurers, including the health 
insurance industry.9 States have myriad other laws governing institutions 
such  as  hospitals, nursing  homes, ambulatory  surgery  centers, and other 
 
 
7 See, e.g., Humphrey Taylor, Why Is Health Care Reform So Difficult in the United States, Health Care 
Blog, Dec. 22, 2009, at http:// www.thehealthcareblog.com/the_health_care_blog/2009/12/why-health- 
care-reform-is-so-difficult-in-the-united-states.html. 
8  See generally Glenn H. Reynolds and David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: Some Observations  
for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511 (1999-2000). 
9  See, "State regulation of the insurance industry is primarily accomplished by means of state statutes  gov- 
erning unfair insurance trade practices and by state departments of insurance that receive their regulatory 
authority from these statutes." Katie Cook Morgan, Leaving the Management of "Managed Care" Up to the 
States: The Health Insurance Industry and the Need for Regulation of the Regulators, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 
225, 235 (1996-1997). 
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facilities; in addition, states regulate and license individual practitioners.10 
A health care entity wishing to vertically integrate would need to consider 
state laws governing insurers, as well as those governing providers. The 
corporate practice of medicine doctrine11  – depending on the state – might 
raise further barriers to employing physicians. States may also require 
regulatory notice or approval for certain corporate transactions, such as 
mergers or acquisitions.12 In some states, a certificate of need is required  
to construct a new facility or even for a transfer of ownership of such a fa- 
cility.13 “Any willing provider” laws, too, could interfere with a vertically 
integrated entity that wants to directly employ health care providers and 
essentially create a closed system.14 Innumerable other state insurance 
mandates would likely impede an integration strategy. 
At the federal level, different but equally complex legal questions 
arise. The formation and operation of the vertically integrated entity could 
pose major antitrust concerns under the Sherman Act,15 the Clayton Act,16 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.17 Taking formation first, parties 
should examine whether vertical integration (e.g., an insurer’s acquisition 
of hospital system) would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, which pro- 
hibits mergers or acquisitions that would substantially foreclose competi- 
tion.18 Similarly, the formation of the vertically integrated entity may vio- 
late section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts that 
unreasonably restrain trade.19 For both analyses, the key question is 
whether the effect of any acquisitions is to substantially lessen competition 
in the relevant market. A separate inquiry is operational: Would the verti- 
cally integrated entity, once created, monopolize the market in violation 
section 2 of the Sherman Act?20   A monopoly in a given market is not  per 
 
 
 
10 See, e.g., Illinois laws such as the Hospital Licensing Act, 210 ILCS 85/1 et seq., Nursing Home Act, 210 
ILCS 45/1-101 et seq., Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act, 210 ILCS 5/1 et seq., Medical Practice 
Act of 1987, 225 ILCS 60/1 et seq., Nurse Practice Act, 225 ILCS 65/50-1 eq seq. 
11 See, e.g., Parker v. Bd. of Dental Examiners of State of Cal., 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932); State v. 
Winneshiek Co-op. Burial Ass'n, 237 Iowa 556, 22 N.W.2d 800 (1946). 
12  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 165.40 (requiring approval for certain acquisitions from the state attorney 
general, the insurance commissioner, and the department of health services). 
13  Mark E. Kaplan, Comment, An Economic Analysis of Florida's Hospital Certificate of Need Program  
and Recommendations for Change, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 475, 478 (1991-1992). 
14 James W. Childs, You May Be Willing, But Are You Able? A Critical Analysis of "Any Willing Provider" 
Legislation, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 199, 199 (1996-1997). 
15 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1890) (“Sherman Act”). 
16  Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§12-27 (1914) (“Clayton Act”). 
17  Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 USC §§ 41-58 (1914) (“FTC Act”). 
18  Clayton Act, supra note 16. 
19  Sherman Act, supra note 15. 
20  Id. 
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se unlawful, but it may be unlawful if acquired or maintained through un- 
lawful (predatory or exclusionary) conduct. 
Finally, there are numerous legal issues related to the business 
model and organization. What should the legal structure of the integrated 
system be? Is it permissible (or appropriate) to house an insurer, hospital 
systems, and physician practices in a single corporate entity, or should 
they be split into two or more distinct entities – but still closely interrelated 
and bound by mutually exclusive contracts – as in the Kaiser Permanente 
model?21 The financial and capital requirements also pose difficulties: it 
may be more feasible to start on a smaller scale, integrating first in a single 
town or region of a state and then expanding, rather than attempting to in- 
tegrate state-wide, all at once. It is also clear that whoever decides to step 
up and integrate would be taking on additional legal and financial risk. A 
large hospital system may be familiar with regulatory compliance for pro- 
viders and well-acquainted with medical malpractice lawsuits, but if it ac- 
quired a smaller insurer, it would suddenly take on a very new and differ- 
ent kind of risk – health insurance underwriting risk – as well as needing  
to comply with a large number of new regulations that only pertain to the 
insurance industry. The same would be true for larger insurers looking to 
acquire a provider system. 
Part II will also explore the policies behind these regulations and 
ask whether they are appropriate as applied to a vertically integrated health 
care entity. As noted above, the health care system is extraordinarily 
fragmented, and the regulatory regime governing various aspects of this 
system understandably mirrors its fragmentation.22 Different state and 
federal statutes, regulations, and administrative agencies set standards for 
different health care entities. A vertically integrated system, which pro- 
vides all levels of care in all types of health care facilities and handles 
payment and financing of care, has the potential to enhance quality and 
coordination of care, increase access, and dramatically reduce costs.23 Yet 
it is subject to all of the same laws and regulations as all other separate en- 
 
 
21 Douglas McCarthy, Kimberly Mueller, and Jennifer Wrenn, Kaiser Permanente: Bridging the Quality 
Divide with Integrated Practice, Group Accountability, and Health Information Technology, Case Study, 
The Commonwealth Fund (Jun. 2009), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Case%20Study/2009/Jun/1278_McCarthy_ 
Kaiser_case_study_624_update.pdf. 
22 Robert I. Field, Why Is Health Care Regulation So Complex?, 33 PHARMACY AND THERAPEUTICS 607, 
607 (2008) ("...the present regulatory structure is neither uniform nor consistent. A broad range of   regula- 
tory bodies and programs apply in different ways to various aspects of the industry. Health care regulations 
are developed and enforced by all levels of government – federal, state, and local – and also by a large as- 
sortment of private organizations. At times, they operate without coordination."). 
23  See Part I of this paper (the case for vertical integration). 
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tities combined, a huge disincentive to companies considering this route. 
Public policy should encourage such innovation, not hamper it. Further- 
more, the rationale behind many of these regulations may be perfectly 
sound as applied to a single, fragmented institution (e.g., a stand-alone 
hospital), but it may not make sense as applied to an integrated insurer- 
provider system. 
The paper concludes in Part III with recommendations for the reg- 
ulatory landscape of the health care system, particularly with respect to 
vertically integrated organizations. Health care laws and regulations 
should not discourage vertical integration, and their underlying purposes 
should be re-examined in light of the emergence of these entities. Is there 
an ideal landscape for such an integrated system? 
 
I. THE CASE FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
 
For purposes of this paper, “vertical integration” means a com- 
pany’s expansion of its business into areas that are at different stages of 
production or distribution.24 Companies often do this in order to ensure a 
steady supply of a particular input or to ensure that a reliable market exists 
for their output.   A classic example of this is Henry Ford.      Ford needed 
numerous raw materials and supplies for manufacturing automobiles, and 
he faced the continual problems of high costs, shortages of materials, and 
suppliers unable to keep up with demand. “The answer, he decided, was 
total control: owning the whole supply chain. By the 1920s his company 
ran coal and iron ore mines, timberlands, rubber plantations, a railroad, 
freighters, sawmills, blast furnaces, a glassworks, and more.”25 Vertical 
integration – expansion up or down the supply chain in some capacity – is 
distinct from mere horizontal expansion, in which a company continues to 
do the same thing but expands into new regions, or it acquires a competitor 
in the same line of business.26 
 
 
 
 
24 Friedrich Kessler and Richard H. Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 Yale L. J. 1, 
1 (1959-1960) available at http://www.economist.com/node/13173671 (defining vertical integration as “the 
coordination of successive stages of production or distribution”). 
25 The Economist, Moving on up: Is the recession heralding a return to Henry Ford's model?, Mar. 27, 
2009. 
26 John A. Cook et al., Meeting Challenges of Health Care Reform: Vertically Integrated Health Care De- 
livery Systems, 73 Mich. B.J. 170, 171 (1994) (describing vertical integration as the integration of “services 
of physicians and hospitals (and other providers), as contrasted with the horizontal integration created when 
hospitals affiliate among themselves, or when physicians become associated as POs [physician organiza- 
tions], multi-specialty clinics or similar physician groups. An IDS can also include a third tier if an insur- 
ance company … becomes a partner in financing health care coverage.”). 
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Integration in itself offers numerous benefits: “Cost reduction is 
the principal technological justification for vertical integration.”27 This 
broad reason includes: 
increased stability of operations that coordination affords. 
Consumer outlets, sources of supply, and uniformity of 
quality are made more secure, thus increasing the feasibil- 
ity of long-range planning. Facilities can be fully utilized, 
overtime production or idle plant minimized, and inventory 
reduced. Moreover, vertical integration eliminates many 
costs incurred in the transfer of goods from one control to 
another.28 
This description was written in 1959, but it remains just as powerful 
today. A modern exemplar of this strategy is Amazon, the online retailer, 
which has expanded and continues to expand into numerous seemingly un- 
related markets over the past few years, from publishing digital books and 
manufacturing hardware (such as e-readers or television streaming de- 
vices) to offering streaming video content.29 Most recently, the company 
announced plans to begin delivering packages to consumers directly,  
rather than relying on companies like FedEx and UPS to complete the last 
leg of the journey to people’s homes.30            In particular, last winter, these 
shipping companies failed in some cases to deliver packages to consumers 
in time for Christmas, which had a serious negative impact on Amazon.31 
But as a non-integrated system, this was outside of Amazon’s immediate 
control. Delivering its own packages will give Amazon more power over 
the shipping process and will allow it to ensure more reliable and faster de- 
liveries, including receiving items the same day they are ordered, continu- 
ing to deliver late at night, or delivering at more specific times.32 Vertical 
integration, as noted previously, can help a company ensure more reliabil- 
ity in its supply chains, which are critical to its business. It also allows a 
greater degree of control over costs. 
In health care, vertical integration can mean – in a more limited 
sense – one type of provider’s acquisition of a different type of provider. 
One example of this is a hospital acquisition of a physician practice, which 
 
 
27  Kessler, supra note 24, at 2. 
28  Id at 3. 
29 See, e.g., Puneet Sikka, Why Kindle Fire TV will help Amazon expand its customer base, MARKET 
REALIST, Apr. 14, 2014; Liz Gannes and Dawn Chmielewski, Amazon’s Hard Sell: Gaining Developers for 
Its Coming Smartphones, Re/code, Apr. 11, 2014. 
30 Greg Bensinger and Laura Stevens, Amazon, in Threat to UPS, Tries Its Own Deliveries, The Wall St J, 
Apr. 24, 2014. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
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is an increasingly common trend, and one that is actually accelerating un- 
der the Affordable Care Act.33 Physicians generally control a certain vol- 
ume of patients, and the hospital can benefit from this referral stream by 
acquiring the physician practice – though this may raise potential issues 
under the federal anti-kickback law and Stark law, as discussed later.34 
Vertical integration in health care could similarly mean a pharmacy open- 
ing up a line of retail clinics, employing nurse practitioners or other pro- 
fessionals. For purposes of this discussion, the terms “vertically integrated 
entity” and “integrated delivery system” are used interchangeably. One 
useful definition of this concept might be as follows: 
“An integrated delivery system is an organization that fur- 
nishes patients with all levels and types of health care serv- 
ices from affiliated providers and coordinates case man- 
agement and interprovider information flow. An integrated 
delivery system normally provides, at a minimum,   hospi- 
tal, physician, and ancillary health   services.”35 
In this paper, vertical integration is used in its Henry Ford sense – 
that is, its broadest possible sense – to mean a total integration of providers 
at every stage as well as a financing function. Such a completely inte- 
grated entity would include, at a minimum, an insurer, an inpatient hospi- 
tal system, outpatient surgery facilities, traditional clinics and physician 
offices, retail clinics, home health care services, skilled nursing facilities, 
long-term care and rehabilitation facilities, running the gamut in providing 
all necessary levels of care. It would also need to include laboratories, 
pharmacies, pharmaceutical research and development, durable medical 
equipment (DME) developers and manufacturers, and even medical 
schools, which train the physicians that ultimately practice in this system. 
A patient covered under this plan could receive all types of care, from 
complex and acute to routine and preventive, without ever leaving the in- 
tegrated system. 
Two features of this system are worth mentioning at the outset. 
First, nothing like this exists today. Even the most thoroughly integrated 
systems, such as Kaiser Permanente, do not come close to incorporating all 
 
 
 
33 Robert Kocher and Nikhil R. Sahni, Hospitals' Race to Employ Physicians — The Logic behind a Money- 
Losing Proposition, 364 N. ENGL. .J MED. 1790 (May 12, 2011). 
34  42 USC 1320a-7b(b); 42 USC 1395nn. (For example, a hospital paying a physician practice more than 
fair market value for its hard assets could run afoul of the anti-kickback law) 
35 Carl H. Hitchner et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of Organizational Models, 29 Wake Forest 
L Rev 273, 274 (1994). See also Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems 
and Antitrust, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1507 (1994). 
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of these functions.36 Second, only an integrated provider on this grand 
scale could possess the sufficient vision and scope to rearrange the entire 
health care system and restructure the way care is provided.37 In its cur- 
rent, highly splintered state, the health care system cannot fix itself, as no 
single entity has the clout or the financial incentive to overhaul everything 
and rebuild it from the ground up. An integrated system would at least 
have the potential to do so, even if it is a risky and daunting endeavor. 
Several compelling reasons exist to undertake such dramatic vertical inte- 
gration in health care. The reasons generally fall into two categories: the 
first is that, even if integration offered no substantial or obvious benefits as 
compared with the current business models, individual fragmented players 
in this system (whether insurers or providers) will increasingly face an up- 
hill battle and will inevitably be driven out of business. In short, they must 
integrate simply to survive. The second reason is that vertical integration 
does, in fact, offer invaluable benefits. A brief discussion of each of these 
reasons follows. 
As health insurance companies and health care providers increas- 
ingly enter each other’s territories and the lines between their conventional 
business models begin to blur, competition will eventually  undermine 
those who adhere to the old, inflexible regime. From an insurer’s view- 
point, the danger is that large hospital systems are increasingly taking on 
risk, and these providers will find it advantageous to simply vertically in- 
tegrate.  Hospitals have already been acquiring physician practices;   some 
are beginning to acquire small insurance companies as well, or they are 
hiring strategically and building the function in-house.38 Either way, if 
successful, these larger providers may bypass ‘middlemen’ insurance 
companies and beat them at their own game. 
A number of large hospital systems are already moving in this di- 
rection. Dr. Kenneth L. Davis, the CEO and President of Mount Sinai 
Health System – the largest health care provider in the state of New  York 
– believes integrated payor-provider systems are the future: “Inevitably the 
 
 
36 The Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program consists of three separate entities that cooperate under 
mutually exclusive contracts: (1) a foundation that operates a health plan (a payor), (2) a foundation that 
operates a number of hospital systems and outpatient clinics, which include labs, radiology, and pharmacy, 
and (3) a medical group of multi-specialty physicians. Douglas McCarthy, Kimberly Mueller, and Jennifer 
Wrenn, Kaiser Permanente: Bridging the Quality Divide with Integrated Practice, Group Accountability, 
and Health Information Technology, Case Study, The Commonwealth Fund, June 2009. 
37   Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Belknap Press 1994) 
(1991). Chandler argues that at the beginning stages of every industry, it required businesses with suffi- 
cient scale and scope to assemble the value network or fundamentally change the architecture of the system. 
38  Melanie Evans, Cutting out the middleman: Systems buying and developing insurance plans, Modern 
Healthcare, Mar. 23, 2013. 
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large systems are going to move to take part of the premium dollar."39 
Mount Sinai recently entered into a merger agreement with Continuum 
Health Partners in New York City, creating the largest private hospital sys- 
tem  in  the city.40    Dr. Ezekiel Emanuel, chairman  of the Department   of 
Medical Ethics and Health Policy at the University of Pennsylvania and a 
former Obama administration official who helped draft the Affordable 
Care Act, seems to agree.41 Dr. Emanuel puts it even more starkly: he 
states that we are witnessing “the end of insurance companies as we know 
them” and that if insurers want to survive, they “will have to get into the 
business of providing care.”42 In fact, Dr. Emanuel argues that “the wave 
of the future is integrated delivery systems – integrating insurance with de- 
livery function.”43 
In a completely separate threat to the health insurance industry, 
large employers may cut out traditional insurance companies or third-party 
administrators and just take on certain functions themselves. A large em- 
ployer could build on-site clinics and hire health care professionals (in- 
cluding physicians) directly, encouraging prevention and wellness to keep 
employees healthy and keep costs low.44 The employer could also directly 
contract with hospitals and build its own network.45 Some larger self- 
insured employers have already found this to be a beneficial strategy,  and 
as medical costs and health insurance premiums continue their inexorable 
rise, more will likely pursue this path. In sum, insurers that cling to the 
traditional business of offering insurance policies and performing adminis- 
trative services – but that refuse to take on responsibility for providing 
medical care – will be swept into the proverbial historical dustbin.46 
 
 
 
 
39 Rob Garver, Hospitals Plot the End of Insurance Companies, The Fiscal Times, Mar. 27, 2014. 
40 Anemona Hartocollis, 2 Hospital Networks Agree to Merge, Raising Specter of Costlier Care, N.Y. 
Times, Jul. 16, 2013, at A19. 
41  Brianna Ehley, Obamacare Spells the End of Employer-Based Coverage, The Fiscal Times, Mar. 24, 
2014. 
42  Garver, supra note 39. 
43  Id. 
44 Chris Anderson, More large employers adding on-site health clinics, Healthcare Finance News, Mar. 13, 
2013; David G. Knott, Vertical Integration: 80’s Fad or Health Care’s Future? Strategy+Business, Jul. 1, 
1997 (describing six factors that will lead health plans to reconsider vertical integration, including that pro- 
viders’ “ability to pursue ‘direct contracts’ with employers will raise the threat of ‘disintermediation’ for 
insurers -- leading some plans to buy them.”). 
45  Evans, supra note 38. 
46 “…nonintegrated providers with no disruptive business models will experience the financial crises and 
consolidations that befall all disruptees eventually. The major health assistance plans from traditional health 
insurance companies will struggle to remain viable, because the fee-for-service model will be relegated to a 
shrinking portion of the market.” Clayton Christensen, Jerome Grossman, and Jason Hwang, The Innova- 
tor’s Prescription: A Disruptive Solution for Healthcare (McGraw-Hill 2008) at 216. 
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On the flip side, from a provider’s perspective, the situation is just 
as perilous. One danger lies in competitors merging to become the “must- 
have” system in a particular geographic region,47 increasing their bargain- 
ing power for higher reimbursement from payors and decreasing the bar- 
gaining power of any player that remains isolated as a result. An insur- 
ance company that acquires a competing provider system also poses a 
risk.48 In either scenario, providers will have an increasingly difficult time 
obtaining more favorable rates.  If entities maintain the status quo as  frag- 
mented, separate institutions, they will inevitably be out-competed  by  oth- 
ers whose integration gives them  the upper   hand.49 
An isolated entity also lacks the ability and scope to truly control 
the underlying cost of providing medical care. For example, insurers ne- 
gotiate reimbursement rates with providers in a zero-sum game – when 
one wins, the other loses. Both are already operating on thin margins, on 
average,50 so neither can afford to give much. Health insurers had an av- 
erage profit margin of 3.4 percent in 2008,51 for example, and most hospi- 
tals barely break even: the median operating margin for hospitals with 200 
or more beds in 2010 was slightly negative, averaging 0.7 percent.52 
Moreover, in the current fee-for-service (“FFS”) reimbursement system, 
providers have an incentive to deliver (and bill for) as many services as 
possible.53 The Affordable Care Act attempts to reform health care in cer- 
tain ways, but it did not do much to address the cost of care – it mostly 
consists of insurance market reforms.54 To the extent that the current trend 
is to move away from FFS and toward fee-for-value or something similar 
(shifting risk onto providers), this still leaves in place the zero-sum game 
between two distinct parties with clashing economic interests. 
Insurers are also building so-called tiered or narrow networks, 
which have the potential to reduce costs, but they also reduce access for 
members and have attracted attention in the media55 and among certain in- 
 
 
47 See, e.g., Peter Frost, Northwestern, Cadence reach merger deal, Chicago Tribune, May 15, 2014; Anthe 
Mitrakos, Hospital mergers build clout to hike fees, Crain's Chicago Business, Jun. 11, 2012. 
48 Highmark closes $604 mln buyout of West Penn Allegheny bondholders, Reuters, Apr. 29, 2013. 
49 According to Melinda Hatton, general counsel for the American Hospital Association, “hospitals may 
have no choice but to consolidate.” Kate Pickert, Fewer Hospitals May Lead to Higher Prices, Time, Jul. 
23, 2013. 
50 Rick Newman, Why Health Insurers Make Lousy Villains, US News & World Report, Aug. 25, 2009 
51  Id. 
52 David Whelan, America’s Most Profitable Hospitals, Forbes, Aug. 31, 2010. 
53 David Hyman, Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like Everything Else, 36 Am J 
Law Med 370 (2010). 
54 David C. Szostak, What Lawyers Should Know About the Affordable Care Act, Ill Bar J (Aug. 2012). 
55 See, e.g., Anna Wilde Mathews and Christopher Weaver, Insurers Face New Pressure Over Limited Doc- 
tor Choice, The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 6, 2014); Bob Herman, Reform Update: More providers, insurers 
	   
 
2015]      VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN HEALTH CARE 75 
 
terest groups – most notably physicians.56 Increased transparency in prices 
that providers charge would also help somewhat, but none of these ideas 
gets at the underlying cost of care – nor can they, since insurers lack the 
scope to truly control this. A hospital is just as powerless: its overarching 
financial incentive is to fill every inpatient bed to maximize revenue, but 
this would drive up the costs to the system as a whole.     As medical tech- 
nology  improves, fewer hospital beds will be  necessary.57    No  single  entity 
today has a system-wide perspective. Vertical integration is the only way 
to overcome these otherwise insurmountable obstacles and fundamentally 
change the way care is provided. 
Thus, the first compelling reason to undertake vertical integration 
is that those who refuse will find it increasingly difficult to compete with 
those who embrace it, and they will ultimately be driven from the market. 
If this were the only reason to integrate, it would be a sufficient one. 
However, vertical integration also offers significant benefits. Often, health 
care commentators point to the so-called iron triangle of cost, access, and 
quality.58 Increasing any one of these in the current system will come at 
the cost of decreasing another. For example, in a “narrow network,” phy- 
sicians and hospitals will accept lower reimbursement rates (in   exchange 
for higher patient volume) but this obviously decreases access for patients, 
who now have fewer options. Similarly, a network could just focus on the 
highest-quality providers, measurable by standardized and agreed-upon 
metrics, but such a plan would be much more expensive. Once again, we 
are faced with a zero-sum game. 
The reason for such high costs and such poor outcomes in the U.S. 
is the outdated and conflated business models in health care. Medical 
technology and expertise continue to grow increasingly sophisticated, but 
they are absorbed into business models that have solidified and – due to 
the fragmented nature of the system – cannot be changed. No single entity 
has the power or scope to implement new business models and rearrange 
the structure of the entire system.   This is where a totally vertically    inte- 
 
 
showing    appetite    for    narrow    networks    Modern    Healthcare,    Oct.    16,    2014,    available     at 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141016/NEWS/310169963. 
56 American College of Physicians, Annual Report on the State of the Nation’s Health Care, Feb. 11, 2014. 
57 See, e.g., Molly Gamble, The Future of the American Hospital: Role and Relevancy in the Next Decade, 
2012 Becker’s Hospital Review 1, 8, May 7, 2012 (stating that the “growth of outpatient service utilization 
is going to present the largest change to hospitals’ strategic plans in the next decade… A simultaneous de- 
cline in hospital inpatient services is expected.”). 
58 See, e.g. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Telemedicine Reimbursement: Raising the Iron Triangle to a New 
Plateau, 13 Health Matrix 371 n.63 (2003) (“Ideally, a health care system will be low cost, high quality and 
accessible to all who need its services. Cost, quality and access are referred to as ‘the iron triangle’ because 
all three of these goals can never be met.”). 
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grated system offers a deus ex machina – it alone can get its arms around 
the entire system and impose a whole new order, allowing it to provide 
better care at a much lower cost and, therefore, capture enormous savings. 
How, exactly, this payor-provider entity should reorganize the way that 
care is provided could be the subject of a whole paper – indeed, it is the 
subject of an excellent and highly recommended book59 – but the crux of 
the reason vertical integration is so critical is as follows. 
Care is currently trapped in inappropriate business models. On the 
one hand, complex, difficult, high-risk, and uncertain diagnoses and treat- 
ments are appropriately performed by highly trained experts with exten- 
sive training and education, such as physicians. At the other end of the 
spectrum, routine, straightforward, predictable diagnoses and treatments 
can be safely and effectively performed in lower-cost venues by lower- 
cost professionals. The hallmark of this end of the spectrum is that the di- 
agnosis and solution are not unique, but are instead common and predict- 
able.60 It is the medical equivalent of the assembly line that mass produces 
a product, as opposed to crafting highly individualized and unique prod- 
ucts by hand. Neither business model is appropriate for all customers in  
all situations. 
Today’s hospitals and physicians attempt to do everything for eve- 
ryone, combining two separate business models under one roof.61 This is 
extraordinarily inefficient and results in nobody really knowing what any- 
thing should cost.62 The high costs of complex, uncertain, unique care in- 
appropriately inflate the low costs of routine, precise, predictable care. If 
properly separated into two different business models, most health care 
services would cost significantly less than they do today because predict- 
able diagnoses and treatments can be streamlined and replicated at low 
cost.63 The power to orchestrate this degree of change in the health care 
system – separating care out into different business models and even creat- 
ing new venues of care where they do not exist – requires nothing less than 
vertical integration. 
As noted above, the primary purpose of this paper is not to con- 
vince the reader of the benefits of vertically integrating.  This introduction 
 
 
59  Christensen, supra note 46. 
60  Id at 20-27. 
61 Christensen, supra at 75 (“…hospitals [have] commingled value-adding process and solution shop activi- 
ties within the same institution – resulting in some of the most managerially intractable institutions in the 
annals of capitalism.”). 
62 Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, Time, Apr. 4, 2013. 
63 Christensen, supra note 46, at 26 (arguing that this type of disruption to health care has the potential to 
ultimately reduce costs by 20 to 60 percent while simultaneously improving the quality and efficacy of care 
received). 
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to the concept hopefully provides a sufficient overview. However, having 
considered why health care entities would want to integrate, we next turn 
to the laws and regulations that would obstruct such a strategy. 
 
II. THE FRAGMENTED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
A jungle of health care laws and regulations accurately reflects the 
splintered health care system that it governs. These laws are, in part, the 
product of the push-and-pull of different levels of government with differ- 
ent spheres of influence, as well as the product of numerous private actors 
locked in perpetual business struggles, each lobbying for its own self- 
serving legislative agenda.64 Many of these laws were developed in an- 
other era, when the health care system was scarcely recognizable when 
compared with the system today – antitrust laws were written a full cen- 
tury ago, and they were never written for the peculiarities of the health  
care industry. The Stark and anti-kickback laws were passed in an era of 
independent physicians, in part due to the concern that hospitals could be 
buying a referral stream. Today, though, physician employment in hospi- 
tals is more prevalent than ever and steadily increasing.65 These statutes, 
and others that constitute the overarching regulatory framework in   health 
care, are not even entirely appropriate to the current health care system. 
But even if they were conceded to be appropriate today, a vertically inte- 
grated entity is another matter altogether, and the same framework cannot 
logically apply. 
 
A. Federal Legal Issues 
1. Antitrust 
a. Formation of the Vertically Integrated Entity 
 
One of the biggest legal issues that may interfere with vertical inte- 
gration is inevitably antitrust. Conceptually, any antitrust analysis might 
best be split into two categories: the formation of the vertically integrated 
entity (e.g., potential merger and acquisition issues), and the operation   of 
 
 
 
64 See, e.g., Robert I. Field, Why Is Health Care Regulation So Complex?, 33 Pharmacy and Therapeutics 
607 (2008) 
65  About 25 percent of specialist physicians were employed by hospitals in 2013, compared with only 5 
percent in 2000. Bob Herman, 7 Trends in Hospital-Employed Physician Compensation, Becker’s Hospital 
Review, Jan. 25, 2013. For primary care physicians, the number employed by hospitals has increased from 
about 20 percent to 40 percent during this time period. Molly Gamble, Are Hospital-Employed Physicians 
Synonymous With Higher Prices? Becker’s Hospital Review, Aug. 27, 2012. 
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the entity after it is created (e.g., potential monopolization issues). These 
will be discussed separately below. 
Antitrust analysis generally only involves a few major statutes – the 
Sherman Act,66 the Clayton Act,67 and the Federal Trade Commission  
(“FTC”) Act68 – but it can become extraordinarily complex and depend  
heavily on facts and circumstances. The formation of  a  vertically  inte-  
grated entity might trigger scrutiny under  two  provisions,  in  particular.  
First, section 7 of the Clayton Act   states: 
"No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affect- 
ing commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the 
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade 
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the as- 
sets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any 
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of com- 
merce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section 
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub- 
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a mo- 
nopoly."69 
 
The key question here is whether the effect of any merger or ac- 
quisition is to substantially lessen competition in the relevant product and 
geographic market. If so, the transaction might violate section 7 of the 
Clayton Act. 
The other major relevant provision that such a transaction impli- 
cates is section 1 of the Sherman Act, which states: “Every contract, com- 
bination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade  or commerce  among  the  several States, or with  foreign nations, is 
declared  to  be  illegal."70    Despite this absolute language, not literally  every 
contract that restrains trade is unlawful. The key question is whether it un- 
reasonably restrains trade.71 In one of the early leading cases, Justice 
Brandeis explained: 
“Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of 
trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very es- 
sence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint   im- 
 
 
66  Sherman Act, supra note 15. 
67  Clayton Act, supra note 16. 
68  FTC Act, supra note 17. 
69  Clayton Act, supra note 16. 
70  Sherman Act, supra note 15. 
71 Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918). 
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posed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby 
promotes competition or whether it is such as may sup- 
press or even destroy competition. To determine that ques- 
tion, the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to 
the business to which the restraint is applied, its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the 
restraint, and  its  effect, actual or probable.”72 
Under either antitrust statute, a court would perform the traditional 
“rule of reason” analysis, which would require properly identifying the 
relevant product market and geographic market at issue, and then weighing 
the pro-competitive benefits of the transaction against its anti-competitive 
effects.73 The standard depends heavily upon the circumstances in a par- 
ticular situation and is necessarily somewhat subjective; in fact, the entire 
rule of reason analytical framework is arguably problematic and flawed.74 
Nevertheless, each step, each corporate transaction in the formation 
of a vertically integrated entity would need to be analyzed separately and 
undergo a thorough rule of reason analysis. More frequently, a horizontal 
merger or acquisition takes place and the analysis is more straightforward, 
because everything is happening in the same market. For example, if a 
particular region has three large hospital systems, and two of them decide 
to merge, there may be a significant reduction in competition for the  serv- 
ices that they provide, and the deal might violate section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.75 With vertical integration, however, the parties to the transaction 
may not be competing against each other – rather, each competes with oth- 
ers in two or more different markets.      As a result, two separate analyses 
would be required, involving the effect on competition in each relevant 
market.76 
To help clarify this point, as an example, a health insurance com- 
pany might propose to acquire a hospital system in Chicago, Illinois. In 
this case, the relevant product market might be “general acute care inpa- 
tient services” because the hospital is competing against other hospitals in 
providing these services to patients.  The antitrust question is: to what  ex- 
 
 
72 Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918). 
73 Standard Oil Co. of NJ v. United States, 221 US 1 (1911) (establishing rule of reason analysis). 
74 Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law? 42 UC DAVIS L.Rev. 1375, 1421 
(2009) (arguing that the rule of reason has been criticized for its inaccuracy, its poor administrability, its 
subjectivity, its lack of transparency, and its inconsistent results). 
75  Clayton Act (prohibiting any corporation from acquiring another corporation where the effect of such 
acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between them, or to restrain commerce, or to tend to 
create a monopoly). 
76  Oliver Hart and Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, 1990 Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 205 (1990). 
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tent does this acquisition substantially lessen or foreclose competition in 
the relevant product and geographic market? (Alternatively, the product 
market might be outpatient services if the hospital also provides them, or 
health insurance products because that is the market in which the insurer 
competes.) The relevant geographic market might depend on how large an 
area the hospital serves – how far do patients typically travel who use   the 
hospital’s services?77  – but for simplicity, let us say the geographic market 
is the city of Chicago. Looking solely at inpatient services in Chicago, 
then, other health insurance companies that contract with hospitals in the 
city would now potentially have one less hospital from which to purchase 
these services. In this case, other hospitals might now enjoy better bar- 
gaining power with other insurers, allowing them to obtain higher reim- 
bursement and therefore driving up prices for consumers. Or, now that the 
insurer owns the hospital, it may attempt to inappropriately require its en- 
rollees to use its own hospital and prevent them from using others, which 
could be an unlawful tying arrangement (discussed further below). Chi- 
cago happens to have quite a few hospital systems, but in more rural areas 
there may be fewer competitors and this could cause much greater relative 
harm to consumers and a more substantial loss of competition. These are 
some of the types of anti-competitive effects that the antitrust laws seek to 
avoid. 
A rule of reason analysis would then involve looking in-depth at 
the competitors (here, hospital systems offering inpatient services) in the 
relevant market and determining market share and market concentration. 
Courts have suggested that antitrust concerns typically arise with at    least 
30-40 percent market foreclosure.78   In an early leading case dealing  with 
vertical integration, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that the merger of two manufacturers and sellers of shoes violated 
section 7 of the Clayton Act.79 The Court explained that “[i]f the share of 
the market foreclosed is so large that it approaches monopoly propor- 
tions,” then it would violate both the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act.80 
On the other hand, a de minimis amount of market foreclosure would not 
trigger a violation.   Between these two extremes, the percentage alone   is 
 
 
 
77 The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission may look at supplier location or customer 
location in order to define a geographic market. See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Com- 
mission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, sec. 4.2 (2010). 
78  See, e.g., Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and Consumer Harm, 70 Antitrust L 
J 311, at 324 (2002) (“Post-Beltone decisions routinely sustained the legality of exclusive dealing arrange- 
ments with foreclosure percentages of 40 percent or less.”). 
79  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
80  Id at 328. 
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not decisive – other factors, like the nature and purpose of the transaction 
or the trend toward concentration in the industry, must be considered.81 In 
general, the fewer the competitors and the higher the market concentration, 
the more suspect a merger or acquisition in that market. 
Finally, having defined the relevant product and geographic mar- 
kets and having reviewed the competitors’ market share and market con- 
centration, a court would determine the likelihood that the transaction 
would, on balance, be anti-competitive. Market concentration is important 
and, if sufficiently high, it may lead to a presumption that the transaction 
would be unlawful. However, other factors merit consideration, as well: 
generally speaking, the extent to which a transaction forecloses competi- 
tion in the relevant market is critical.82 
If an Insurer A were to acquire Hospital B, one factor in the analy- 
sis would be whether the contract is exclusive in either direction, or even 
mutually exclusive. In other words, would members enrolled in one of In- 
surer A’s plans be required to use Hospital B (and would then any other 
hospital be considered out-of-network for that enrollee)? Likewise, would 
Hospital B only accept as in-network patients who had insurance coverage 
through Insurer A? Imagine a hospital system with an inpatient admis- 
sions market share of 20 percent. If this hospital system were acquired by 
an insurer and could not contract with any other commercial insurer (at 
least, as an in-network provider), then competitors in the health insurance 
market in Chicago would potentially be foreclosed from 20 percent of 
business in the market for general acute care inpatient services. This is a 
fairly large amount of the market, and depending on circumstances and 
other factors, it could trigger a problem under antitrust laws. 
If the transaction were presumed anti-competitive, then pro- 
competitive benefits might be offered to rebut this presumption.83 How- 
ever, this is a difficult hurdle to overcome. Courts look at barriers to entry 
in the industry and efficiencies that would result84 – although any efficien- 
cies must be real and verifiable, not speculative.85 For example, in the for- 
mation of a vertically integrated entity, the parties might demonstrate  that 
 
 
81  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 329. 
82 See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and Consumer Harm, 70 Antitrust L J 311 
(2002). 
83 FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, at 1302 (1996). 
84 See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. University Health Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir.1991) 
(“[E]vidence that a proposed acquisition would create significant efficiencies benefitting consumers is use- 
ful in evaluating the ultimate issue – the acquisition’s overall effect on competition.”). 
85 See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, sec. 10 
(2010) (“Efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague, speculative, or otherwise cannot be 
verified by reasonable means.”). 
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that an increase in the quality of care would result, as well as a dramatic 
reduction in costs of providing medical care, resulting in much lower 
prices for consumers. Generally, though, courts are skeptical without con- 
crete evidence – ideally, historical evidence that the defendants engaged in 
similar transactions in the past and real efficiencies were documented. In 
addition, any savings must have been passed on to consumers. 
The foregoing analysis, and in particular the decision in Brown 
Shoe, demonstrates how perilous the antitrust laws can be, and how hostile 
an attitude the judiciary can establish, for businesses that decide to verti- 
cally integrate. According to Herbert Hovenkamp, a law professor and an- 
titrust expert, with the Court’s decision in Brown Shoe, “. . . antitrust pol- 
icy set out on a counterproductive, decade-long enterprise of  condemning 
efficient mergers that would have benefitted consumers, simply because 
they made it more difficult for smaller rivals to compete.”86 The whole  
rule of reason analysis is complicated but also inherently subjective and to 
some  extent arbitrary.   For example, in  another landmark  antitrust case, 
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Justice Douglas wrote for the major- 
ity that vertical integration violates antitrust laws “if it was a calculated 
scheme to gain control over an appreciable segment of the market and to 
restrain or suppress competition, rather than an expansion to meet legiti- 
mate business needs.”87 But what assurance is there that integration for 
legitimate business purposes would not be viewed by a court as an unlaw- 
ful anti-competitive scheme? 
Professor Hovenkamp also notes that the government’s “argu- 
ments against vertical integration became increasingly fantastic”88 as the 
twentieth century progressed, and that the “truly extraordinary thing about 
vertical integration of all kinds is how robustly it developed through the 
twentieth century in the face of a legal regime that was rarely accommo- 
dating and often hostile.”89 This does not bode well for an entity looking  
to integrate. 
In sum, the effect of such a merger or acquisition on competition  
in a particular market is uncertain, and it could trigger a violation of the 
antitrust statutes. Yet the concern behind these laws is misplaced when it 
comes to the formation of a vertically integrated entity in health care. A 
thoroughly integrated system  would lower costs and create much     better 
 
 
86 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960, 95 
IOWA.L.REV. 863, 910 (2010). 
87 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948). 
88  Hovenkamp, supra note 86, at 915. 
89 Id at 917 (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1947); United States v. N.Y. 
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 85 (7th Cir. 1949)). 
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quality of care, both of which would be beneficial to consumers. Antitrust 
laws that block such outcomes, in this context, do a disservice to their in- 
tended purpose. 
 
b. Operation of the Vertically Integrated Entity 
 
As mentioned above, the antitrust analysis is conceptually best split 
into two clusters of issues: those related to the formation of the entity, and 
those related to its operation once it is formed. The operation of the verti- 
cally-integrated entity might trigger potential monopolization issues. 
Namely, section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: 
“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to mo- 
nopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall   be 
deemed guilty of a   felony…”90 
Courts have interpreted this to mean that monopoly (i.e., a suffi- 
ciently large market share and degree of market power) is not per se un- 
lawful, but that monopolization (i.e., acquiring or maintaining monopoly 
power through predatory or exclusionary conduct) is unlawful.91   Here, the 
key questions would therefore be: once the integrated system is formed 
and has begun operating, does it possess sufficient market power in an ap- 
propriately defined market? And if so, is it wielding this market power in  
a prohibited way? 
A monopolist can engage in unlawful predatory conduct in a vari- 
ety of ways. For example, it can establish a tying arrangement, in which a 
seller with sufficient market power basically says, “if you want to buy the 
very  popular Product A  [called the ‘tying product’], then you also    must 
buy  the  less  popular  Product  B  [called  the  ‘tied  product’].”92    Regarding 
this arrangement, courts have stated that: 
The essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement 
lies in the seller’s exploitation of its control over the tying 
product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied prod- 
uct that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have 
preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.   When 
 
 
90  15 USC § 2. 
91 US v. Grinnell Corp, 384 US 563, 570-71 (1966) (“The offense of monopoly under §2 of the Sherman  
Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful ac- 
quisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”). 
92 Jefferson Parish Hosp District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 US 2, 2 (1984). 
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such ‘forcing’ is present, competition on the merits in the 
market for the tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act 
is violated.93 
In Jefferson Parish, the case from which the above quote is taken, 
the Supreme Court found that despite the existence of a tying arrangement, 
the Sherman Act was not violated because the hospital only had 30 percent 
market share, which was insufficient to establish the element of forcing. 
Another way monopolists can wield their power unlawfully is 
through an exclusive dealing contract. These contracts can be unlawful; 
they operate to prevent a distributor from selling the products of a com- 
petitor. For example, in United States v. Dentsply International, a domi- 
nant manufacturer of artificial teeth used in dentures had a practice of 
dropping  dealers  who  took  on  competitors’  products.94       Since   Dentsply 
had such a large market share – 75 to 80 percent of the market, based on 
revenue, and 15 times larger than the next largest competitor – dealers had 
to choose between offering only Dentsply’s products or offering others but 
losing Dentsply (and therefore losing the majority of their sales).95 Pre- 
dictably, no dealers chose to drop Dentsply products. The court found that 
this practice constituted an unlawful exclusionary dealing arrangement and 
violated the Sherman Act and Clayton Act.96 
Anticompetitive leveraging, too, is a danger that monopolists may 
pose. Similar to a tying arrangement, anticompetitive leveraging is the use 
of monopoly power in one market to amplify or leverage power in another, 
more competitive market. In White and White, Inc. v. American Hospital 
Supply Corp. (“AHSC”), a national distributor of hospital supplies entered 
into a purchase agreement with a group of hospitals that offered the hospi- 
tals volume discounts and a price increase limit in return for a high volume 
of purchases by the group from AHSC’s full range of hospital supply 
products.97 White and White, Inc. and other local distributors of surgical 
supplies sued, arguing that AHSC violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act. In this case, the Sixth Circuit held that AHSC did not actually have 
the requisite monopoly power to violate the antitrust laws, but it laid out 
the basis for anticompetitive leveraging as a prohibited business practice. 
The operation of a completely integrated health care system raises 
special antitrust concerns because it would be a colossal organization,   in- 
 
 
 
93  Jefferson Parish Hosp District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 US at 13. 
94  US v. Dentsply Int’l, 399 F.3d 181 (3rd Cir. 2005). 
95  Id at 185. 
96  Id at 196. 
97 White and White, Inc. v. Am Hosp Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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corporating everything from an insurance function to large hospital sys- 
tems, numerous retail clinics, pharmacies, laboratories, medical device and 
drug manufacturers, and much more. Each of these businesses would 
normally operate in one or more distinct product markets, but the danger in 
this context would be that the fully integrated system exercises its market 
power in an unlawful or exclusionary way. As with the prior section dis- 
cussing formation of the entity, a rule of reason analysis is necessary to 
weigh the procompetitive benefits against the anti-competitive effects. 
For example, if the insurer arm of the organization enjoyed a very large 
market share, then it would need to be careful about requiring its enrollees 
to use its medical facilities (a potential tying arrangement). In such a large 
organization offering so many different products and services, potential 
tying arrangements could occur. Similarly, exclusive dealing contracts 
would probably be in place: numerous vendor and supplier contracts  
would be required, and the entity must take care not to wield any market 
power to unlawfully exclude competitors from any markets. 
The concern behind these laws and their interpretation and en- 
forcement over the past century has been that two or more competitors 
may be tempted to agree on prices, or a single firm might unfairly corner 
the market. In either case, the businesses involved may raise prices above 
competitive levels, harming competition and consumers. In health care, 
competing hospitals, physicians, or insurers could potentially collude in 
this way. Collusion or monopolization could also take place at different 
levels in the supply chain: a sufficiently large hospital system could wield 
its market power unlawfully by telling insurers that if they contract with 
any other hospitals in the region, the insurer will receive a much lower 
discount. If the hospital is a large “must-have” facility, then most or all 
insurers may decide to contract exclusively with it, to the detriment of 
competing hospitals.        One Texas hospital system  did just this,98  and it is a 
classic example of monopolization through exclusionary conduct. 
In the normal, highly fragmented health care world, these concerns 
are valid and the antitrust laws may be necessary to prevent such evils. 
However, these same laws deter and unnecessarily complicate vertical in- 
tegration. In a relatively simple merger between a hospital and an insurer, 
things would get complicated and expensive quickly. Both entities would 
need to hire legal counsel that specialize in antitrust as well as economic 
experts to perform costly analyses, determining market share in their re- 
spective markets and the competitive impacts of the transaction.   Depend- 
 
 
98 US v. United Reg’l Health Care System, U.S. Dept. of Justice Final Judgment (Sept. 29, 2011), available 
at    http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f276000/276027.pdf. 
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ing on whether certain dollar thresholds are met, the parties may need to 
file a pre-merger notification with federal authorities and pay a filing fee.99 
Regulators may make a second request for additional information, dwarf- 
ing the first filing in terms of resources needed to properly respond: this 
can take months or even years and require a tremendous output of legal ef- 
fort in negotiations and due diligence.100 The administrative agency could 
challenge the deal, seeking to stop it by filing for a preliminary injunction 
in court. Either the agency or a court could find the transaction violates 
antitrust laws and it will be blocked from proceeding.101 Finally, private 
litigation by other affected parties (such as a rival hospital or insurer) 
based on the antitrust laws could erect similar obstacles. The outcome at 
every stage is uncertain, and even if the transaction is ultimately allowed  
to proceed, the laws will have exacted a serious toll on all participants. 
This also creates a serious chilling effect on attempts at vertical integration 
– entities that were otherwise considering the strategy might decide it is 
not worth the cost and risk. 
If the public policy goal is to align the financial incentives of all 
parties and reduce overall costs in the health care system – as decades of 
Congressional and state legislation seem to imply is the case – then verti- 
cal integration should be seen as a desirable strategy, generating tremen- 
dous efficiencies that benefit consumers in the form of much lower prices 
and higher quality health care, while also increasing access to care. Such 
broader policy goals should not be obstructed by myopic and antiquated 
antitrust concerns. 
 
2. Anti-kickback and Stark 
 
While antitrust law might present the largest and most complex set    
of issues, other federal laws  would  also  impede  vertical  integration.  
Among the most prominent of these are the federal anti-kickback statute102  
and  physician  self-referral  (“Stark”) law.103 
 
 
99  15 USC § 18a. 
100 Can Your Second Request Vendor Make the Impossible Possible? Kiersted/Systems White Paper (2011), 
available at http://www.kiersted.com/public/products/white- 
papers/kiersted_ftc_2nd_request_whitepaper.pdf (“Few legal events are as all-consuming as the M&A sec- 
ond request. In recent years, complying with this most difficult of legal challenges has become more costly 
and complex…”). 
101    Premerger  Notification  and  the  Merger  Review  Process,  Federal  Trade  Commission,  available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/premerger-notification- and-
merger. 
102  Anti-kickback Statute, 42 USC 1320a-7b(b) (2014) (“AKS”). 
103 The Ethics in Patient Referral Act of 1989, 42 USC 1395nn (2010) (“Stark”). This law is named for its 
initial sponsor, U.S. Congressman Pete Stark. 
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The federal anti-kickback statute prohibits the exchange of remu- 
neration with the intent to induce referrals of patients for Medicare or 
Medicaid services.104  The law provides for penalties against anyone who: 
knowingly and willfully solicits, receives, offers, or pays 
remuneration, in cash or in kind, to induce or in return for: 
(1) referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or 
arranging for the furnishing of any item or service payable 
under the Medicaid or Medicaid programs, or (2) purchas- 
ing, leasing, or ordering or arranging for or recommending 
purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, 
or  item  payable  under  the  Medicare  or  Medicaid   pro- 
grams.105 
The statute also contains a number of exceptions or safe harbors 
for certain specified remuneration or compensation arrangements that will 
not violate the otherwise broad prohibition.106 For example, any amount 
paid by an employer to an employee who has a bona fide employment re- 
lationship with the employer for employment in the provision of covered 
services is exempt (“employment exception”).107 
The Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) in the U.S. Department  
of Health and Human Services is one of several agencies responsible for 
overseeing and enforcing the Medicare and Medicaid programs, including 
the anti-kickback statute. Particularly relevant in the context of vertical in- 
tegration, the OIG has stated that when a hospital acquires a physician 
practice – or another entity acquires both – any upfront payment must be 
only for the hard assets of the practice, and any subsequent payments to 
the physicians must be for services rendered.108           Anything in excess of this 
is suspect as potentially paying for a referral stream, which would violate 
the anti-kickback statute.109 Intent is also required to demonstrate a viola- 
tion, so it is important to clarify in any acquisition of a physician practice 
that the intent is not to induce referrals: parties must demonstrate that the 
consideration paid is consistent with fair market value.110 
 
 
104  AKS, supra note 102. 
105 Id. 106  42 USC 1320a-7b(b)(3). 
107  42 USC 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B). 
108 D. McCarty Thornton, Letter concerning the application of the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback 
statute to the acquisition of physician practices, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health 
& Human Services, Dec. 22, 1992. available at 
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/safeharborregulations/acquisition122292.htm 
109 Id. 110 Barton C. Walker, Kristian A. Werling, & Anna M. Timmerman, Physician Practice Acquisitions: Key 
Legal Concerns for Hospital Boards and Executives, BoardRoomPress, Apr. 2011. 
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The OIG has issued numerous advisory opinions under the anti- 
kickback statute, providing its interpretation of what specific practices are 
prohibited.111 These opinions depend heavily on the particular facts and 
circumstances and cannot be relied on for other parties, but they are never- 
theless instructive. Courts have also been called on to decide whether cer- 
tain arrangements violate the anti-kickback statute. 
The anti-kickback statute is an impediment to vertical integration 
because a hospital or other entity would need to acquire physician prac- 
tices or hire individual physicians as employees. When this happens, there 
may be a possibility that the compensation paid to the physicians or their 
practice group would be in excess of fair market value and would be per- 
ceived instead as paying for the value of a referral stream of patients to the 
hospital or other entity.  The integrated system could therefore find itself  
in violation of the anti-kickback provisions, even despite the employment 
exception. 
Interpretations of the anti-kickback law “reach conduct far beyond 
the traditional, straightforward kickback or bribe, and now affect the 
healthcare community's conduct in a broad spectrum of ordinary business 
transactions.”112   Arguably, this law overreaches and overregulates even in 
the modern health care system. Furthermore, it subjects providers to a 
great deal of uncertainty: “Despite the abundance of administrative inter- 
pretations, judicial decisions, and the promulgation of the safe harbor 
regulations, it is still unclear precisely which business arrangements the 
law prohibits and which business arrangements the law protects.    Moreo- 
ver, the reach of the Anti-Kickback Statute appears to be extending, rather 
than narrowing.”113 A strong argument can be made that this law is not 
appropriate in the current fragmented system. But it is certainly inappro- 
priate as applied to an integrated delivery system, where the same financial 
incentives and the same policy concerns no longer exist. 
The federal physician self-referral law (commonly known as the Stark law, 
or just “Stark”) prohibits physician referrals for certain “designated health 
services” if there is a financial relationship between the physician and the 
entity to which the referral is made.114 It is a strict liability statute, so a 
physician can violate it regardless of intent.115 “Designated health serv- 
ices” is a defined  term  that includes clinical lab  services, radiology   and 
 
 
111 42 USC 1320-7d(b) and 42 CFR part 1008 (authority for OIG advisory opinions). 
112 David E. Matyas, Carrie Valiant, et al., Legal Issues in Healthcare Fraud and Abuse: Navigating the Un- 
certainties 21 (American Health Lawyers Association 2012, 4th ed.). 
113  Id at 24. 
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imaging services, physical therapy, durable medical equipment, and inpa-  
tient and outpatient hospital   services.116 
Stark applies to Medicare and, indirectly, to Medicaid as well. The 
law does not prohibit the referral of Medicaid patients, but rather author- 
izes the federal government to deny state programs the federal matching 
funds for any Medicaid services pursuant to a referral which would have 
been prohibited if the patient had been a Medicare beneficiary.117 For 
practical purposes, therefore, Stark is applicable to both Medicare and 
Medicaid. Frequently, physicians in practices that are being  acquired 
make referrals to the hospital that is acquiring them, so entities and physi- 
cians need to comply with a Stark exception if they want to ensure the 
transaction is not illegal.118 
As with the anti-kickback statute, Stark contains a number of ex- 
ceptions to its otherwise broad prohibition on compensation arrangements. 
Under Stark, for example, hospitals may pay physicians as employees as 
long as the amount paid is: (i) for identifiable services, (ii) consistent with 
fair market value, (iii) not determined by taking into account the volume or 
value or referrals by the physician to the hospital, and (iv) commercially 
reasonable.119 
The United States government has taken parties to court when it 
believes certain practices violate Stark. In United States v. Halifax Hospi- 
tal Medical Center, a federal district court held that a hospital’s compensa- 
tion of physicians can violate Stark, even if the hospital employs the  phy- 
sicians and the pool of compensation is distributed proportionally based on 
the services each physician performs.120 In Halifax, the hospital employed 
six medical oncologists and set up a compensation structure that included a 
bonus for the physicians’ Medicare referrals to the hospital.121 The hospi- 
tal set aside a certain pool of money as an incentive payment that was to be 
divided between the six physicians based on each physician’s share of  
their total billing for professional services.122 The hospital argued that the 
arrangement fell within the bona fide employment exception to Stark be- 
cause the bonus payment was based on services personally performed   by 
 
 
 
116  42 USC 1395nn(h)(6). 
117 Robert G. Homchick, Top 10 Lessons Learned from the Physician Practice Acquisition Wars: Stark and 
Anti-kickback Issues in Physician Compensation, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, June. 2010. 
118 Barton C. Walker, Kristian A. Werling, & Anna M. Timmerman, Physician Practice Acquisitions: Key 
Legal Concerns for Hospital Boards and Executives, BoardRoomPress, Apr. 2011. 
119  § 1395nn(e)(2). 
120  United States v. Halifax Hosp Med Ctr, 2013 WL 6017329 (M.D. Fla. 2013). 
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the oncologists.123 However, the court held that this is insufficient to bring 
the payment within the employment exception: the bonus was divided up 
based on services that the oncologists personally performed, but the total 
size of the bonus was based on other facts as well, including revenue from 
referrals that the oncologists made for designated health services.124 
Another recent court case involving a Stark violation is United 
States v. Tuomey Healthcare System.125 In that case, a number of special- 
ist physicians informed Tuomey that they were considering performing 
outpatient surgical procedures in their offices, rather than at Tuomey Hos- 
pital, which would mean a significant loss of revenue for the hospital.126  
In order to prevent this, Tuomey entered into agreements with the physi- 
cians to perform outpatient procedures exclusively at Tuomey Hospital.127 
As part of the agreements, the hospital agreed to pay each physician an 
annual base salary that depended on the hospital’s total revenue for the 
outpatient procedures, as well as a bonus.128  A physician who did not  
reach such an agreement with the hospital filed suit under the qui tam pro- 
visions of the False Claims Act and the United States intervened, asserting 
a violation of the Stark law, among several other counts.129 
The Fourth Circuit held that the facility component of the physi- 
cians’ personally performed services constitutes a referral, and that the 
physicians were therefore making referrals to Tuomey, for purposes of 
Stark.130    Furthermore, the court held that the compensation received    by 
the physicians that takes into account the volume or value of anticipated 
referrals falls within the prohibition, and it remanded to the district court to 
determine whether the contracts, on their face, took into account the value 
or volume of anticipated referrals.131 
Halifax and Tuomey illustrate the complexity of establishing a 
compensation package for a health care system that directly employs phy- 
sicians without violating Stark. The employer, or integrated health system, 
needs to ensure that the compensation for any physicians that it employs is 
not based, even in part, on the system’s profits or revenues related to   any 
 
 
 
 
123  United States v. Halifax Hosp Med Ctr, at 8. 
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referrals.132 And even where the physician’s salary or bonus seems inde- 
pendent of the value of referrals, Stark may nevertheless be violated if the 
compensation greatly exceeds the fair market value of the physician’s ser- 
vices.133 
In the context of vertical integration, the Stark and anti-kickback 
laws are inappropriate and antiquated. Health care entities undertaking in- 
tegration are provided assurances under the employee exception, for ex- 
ample, yet case law has significantly restricted the exception and placed 
these entities in a very uncertain regulatory environment.134 The broad 
prohibitions and their respective exceptions can become extraordinarily 
difficult to navigate on a practical level; these laws may pose serious ob- 
stacles to comprehensive vertical integration and must be carefully consid- 
ered in its planning and execution. 
The anti-kickback statute’s purpose is “to protect patients and the 
federal healthcare programs from fraud and abuse by curtailing the cor- 
rupting influence of money on health care decisions.”135 Stark’s purpose, 
similarly, is: 
to prevent overutilization by prohibiting a physician from 
making a referral for certain services to an entity with 
whom the physician has a compensation arrangement or 
ownership interest except in certain situations, and to en- 
sure that physicians’ medical judgments are not compro- 
mised  by  improper  financial  incentives  and  are    based 
solely on the best interests of the   patient.136 
The concern underlying both of these laws is generally that physi- 
cians may refer patients for unnecessary services (driving up costs to the 
federal government and to the health care system as a whole) or they may 
refer to certain providers or facilities for self-interested financial   reasons, 
 
 
 
132 Peter W. Chatfield and Timothy P. McCormack, The lurking risks of hospital-employed physicians: 
Stark, Anti-Kickback and False Claims Act compliance, Healthcare Finance News, Mar. 25, 2014 available 
at http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/blog/lurking-risks-hospital-employed-physicians-stark-anti- 
kickback-and-false-claims-act-compliance. 
133 Id. 134 Susan O. Scheutzow and Steven A. Eisenberg, The Employee Exceptions to the Anti-Kickback and Stark 
Laws After Tuomey: What’s a Physician’s Employer to Do?, 4 J. of Health & Life Sci. L. 146, 148, Feb. 
2011 (“…recent interpretations of the Employee Exceptions in Tuomey and other cases and settlements  
may limit the traditional applicability of these Exceptions severely, placing healthcare providers and their 
counsel in the precarious position of not knowing the extent of protection the Employee Exception   offers. 
… The uncertainty not only creates concern for past arrangements, but also may impact the development of 
innovative healthcare delivery models …”). 
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as opposed to making decisions solely based on the best interest of the pa- 
tient. 
These are genuine concerns in the present, fragmented health care 
system. A physician could have a financial interest in a laboratory that 
provides certain services, and she could then refer patients to that lab for 
services even when not medically necessary. Or a hospital could purchase 
a physician practice to obtain its referrals of patients and increase its reve- 
nue, rather than for purposes of better clinical integration or improved co- 
ordination of patient care and outcomes. These laws help protect against 
such overutilization, fraud, and abuse, and they might arguably serve an 
important role in the present disjointed system of care. 
But in light of vertical integration, the Stark and anti-kickback  
laws no longer make sense. As noted above, both of these laws contain an 
exception for employment arrangements, including a health care system’s 
employment of physicians.  But the narrow interpretation of these   excep- 
tions  leaves  much  uncertainty  for  providers.137 The  difficulty  here  is  that 
part of the reason for vertical integration is to put in place novel and radi- 
cally different compensation and care arrangements; to fundamentally 
change and restructure who is providing what care. 
A vertically integrated system, taking a holistic approach, needs 
the flexibility to reimburse different entities providing care based on very 
different business models. The integrated system might employ physi- 
cians and provide them with a base salary, but also put in place certain in- 
centive or bonus payments for achieving quality measures. The physicians 
might refer patients to the integrated system’s own hospital for inpatient or 
outpatient services, or to other facilities, such as for physical therapy or la- 
boratory services. As discussed above, some of these arrangements may 
violate the Stark and anti-kickback laws. However, these restrictions 
should not be applicable – the same concerns are simply not present in a 
vertically integrated entity. The physician and the employing entity have 
the aligned economic interests; there is no reason to think that a salaried 
physician would not be making decisions in the best interests of her pa- 
tients, even with additional incentive payments for quality. 
To explain this point another way: in the current fee-for-service 
system, a physician is reimbursed more for providing more services; a 
provider has no incentive to control utilization. The Stark and anti- 
kickback laws may play a legitimate role here.   In a vertically   integrated 
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system, in contrast, an individual physician has no financial incentive to 
refer for unnecessary services. Further, the system as a whole receives a  
set amount of payment to provide all the care its members need – essen- 
tially a capitation arrangement – and has an economic incentive to control 
utilization. The fraud and abuse laws do not serve any purpose here. 
Stark and anti-kickback were designed for an era of independent 
physicians with ownership interests in certain facilities and services, and 
out of a concern that hospitals might be buying referrals – concerns and 
facts that are absent with vertical integration. In general, laws that seri- 
ously restrict innovative compensation arrangements will reduce the incen- 
tive to vertically integrate and will reduce the benefits for any entity that 
undertakes it. As with antitrust, these laws may make sense in the current 
fragmented context, but not necessarily in an integrated system. 
 
B. State Legal Issues 
1. Powers of HMOs 
 
Some of the federal legal issues can be the most complex and un- 
clear, and they may also contain the most serious consequences if not han- 
dled appropriately throughout a transaction. However, with certain excep- 
tions like those discussed above, states have traditionally played the 
primary role in regulating the health care industry. State laws and regula- 
tions may introduce an additional layer of complexity because every  
state’s regulatory framework is different. 
A plethora of state regulations that govern the practice of medicine 
and various aspects of the health care industry might be implicated in 
studying vertical integration. A few, however, are particularly important  
to entities considering this business strategy. A logical  starting  point 
might be any laws that expressly permit or at least facilitate such integra- 
tion. 
Most states have a Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) 
Act,138 passed several decades ago when HMOs were rising in popularity 
as a way to control medical costs. State HMO laws proliferated after Con- 
gress passed the HMO Act of 1973 to encourage the development of 
HMOs.139 The original idea, at least with a staff-model HMO, was that the 
same entity would provide insurance and also operate hospitals and em- 
ploy physicians, thereby giving the entity the power and scope to align 
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everyone’s financial incentives and curb rising medical costs. This is a 
more limited version of the vertical integration discussed throughout this 
paper, but it is an initial step in the same direction. For a variety of rea- 
sons, it did not quite work as planned,140 but these laws are generally still 
in place141 and payors need to obtain an HMO license if they want to offer 
an HMO product (distinct from an insurance license to offer an insurance 
product).  Illinois, for example, has an HMO Act that is representative   of 
the law in many states. This Act grants specific powers to HMOs, includ- 
ing the power to purchase or operate hospitals and to furnish health care 
services, and the power to directly employ providers.142 
HMOs have changed dramatically in concept over the past few 
decades. As noted above, the initial idea was the  “pure”  staff-model 
HMO, which would serve as a single all-encompassing entity: it would 
provide medical care and it would assume complete financial risk. But 
over the years, the concept of an HMO became much more watered down 
as it was absorbed into the fragmented universe of modern health care.143 
Even by the close of the century, less than 1 percent of HMO enrollees in 
the US were in staff-model plans, and only 8 HMOs (just 1.2 percent) out 
of several hundred in the United States were staff-model plans.144 
Instead of offering a fundamentally different business and risk 
model and a chance to curb rising medical costs, HMOs have become a 
simple variation on traditional networks. An insurance company will typi- 
cally offer an HMO as an alternative to a PPO or other product, but in ei- 
ther case it has to contract with external providers and does not employ 
them directly. Some of the major differences are that an HMO plan (1) 
generally has a narrower network of physicians; (2) often structures the re- 
imbursement as capitation rather than fee-for-service; (3) imposes little to 
no cost-sharing on an enrollee if she receives services in-network, but pro- 
vides no benefits at all if the enrollee receives services out of network; and 
(4) requires an enrollee to designate a primary care physician (who acts as 
gatekeeper) and   to receive a referral from this primary care physician   to 
 
 
 
140 See, e.g., Jan Gregoire Coombs, The Rise and Fall of HMOs: An American Health Care Revolution 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 2005). 
141 Managed Care State Laws and Regulations, Including Consumer and Provider Protections, National 
Conference of State Legislatures, Sept. 2011, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/managed- 
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see any specialists.145 These factors separate HMOs from PPOs as product 
offerings and contracted networks, but they are worlds apart from the orig- 
inal staff-model concept. 
HMO laws are a critical starting point in the analysis because they 
enable any entity with an HMO license to undertake full-scale vertical in- 
tegration. In some cases, a health insurance issuer may already have an 
HMO license and could therefore begin acquiring hospitals and other 
health care facilities, and could similarly begin hiring physicians and other 
professionals. On the flip side, a large provider system might acquire an 
HMO license and begin offering plans under this license. In either case, 
such laws should be analyzed in the relevant state, as they could help to 
provide a solid foundation for integration efforts. The regulatory frame- 
work in health care is nearly an unnavigable labyrinth for any entity that 
vertically integrates, but the HMO laws may at least provide a small but 
serendipitous shortcut. 
 
 
2. Corporate Practice of Medicine 
 
While an HMO law, if wielded properly, may help facilitate verti- 
cal integration, a number of state laws pose daunting obstacles. One such 
obstacle could be a state’s corporate practice of medicine (“CPM”) doc- 
trine. The CPM doctrine prohibits a corporation from practicing medicine 
or employing a physician to provide professional medical services. Some 
states, including Illinois, have carved out certain corporate employers    as 
exceptions to the CPM prohibition, such as hospitals, health maintenance 
organizations, and professional corporations.146 The rationale behind the 
CPM is based on public policy considerations: if corporations were to em- 
ploy physicians, the concern is that the relationship “tends to the commer- 
cialization and debasement” of the profession,147 undermines the physi- 
cian-patient relationship and the physician’s exercise of independent 
medical judgment,148 and causes corporations to inappropriately intrude 
into the practice of medicine because they are not licensed and not subject 
to the same professional standards and regulations as licensed entities.149 
 
 
145 See 21 Ill. Prac.,The Law of Medical Practice in Illinois § 13:2, 13:5 (3d ed.) (2014). 
146 Corporate Practice of Medicine, American Health Lawyers Association, Aug. 10, 2012, available at 
http://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/Health Law Wiki/Corporate Practice of Medicine.aspx; Berlin v. 
Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 179 Ill.2d 1 (Ill. 1997). 
147  Barton v. Codington Country, 2 N.W. 2d 337, 346 (S.D. 1942). 
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149  See State v. Boren, 219 P.2d 566, 570 (Wash. 1950). 
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Since states may take very different approaches to the CPM doctrine – 
from strictly enforcing it to completely disregarding it – it may be more 
helpful here to study a single state’s approach in a bit more detail. Illinois, 
for example, may serve as a representative middle ground: it has a statu- 
tory and common law prohibition against CPM, but it also has several ex- 
ceptions, and the Illinois Supreme Court has recently weighed in on the 
extent to which this doctrine should apply. 
The statutory basis for the doctrine in Illinois is the Medical Prac- 
tice Act of 1987 (“Medical Practice Act”), which prohibits the practice of 
medicine by an individual without a license.150 Since a corporation or  
other entity may not obtain a medical license, Illinois courts have deter- 
mined that it logically follows that a corporation cannot practice  medicine 
– which also means the corporation cannot employ anyone who practices 
medicine, as it would exercise control over the physician’s decisions. In 
one of the early leading cases, the Illinois Supreme Court explained: “The 
qualifications [to practice a profession] include personal characteristics, 
such as honesty, guided by an upright conscience and a sense of loyalty to 
clients or patients, even to the extent of sacrificing pecuniary profit, if nec- 
essary… No corporation can qualify.”151 However, the Medical Practice 
Act specifically allows four business forms to directly employ physicians: 
(1) partnerships, (2) medical or professional service corporations, (3) lim- 
ited liability companies, and (4) professional associations.152 
The CPM doctrine in Illinois (as in most states) is judicially- 
created, and its courts have carved out four practice arrangements that do 
not violate the prohibition against CPM: (1) HMOs, (2) limited health 
service place, (3) voluntary health service plans, and (4) employment by a 
hospital. For example, in Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, the 
Illinois Supreme Court held that the state’s Hospital Licensing Act implic- 
itly allowed licensed hospitals to employ physicians. The Court declared  
in its explanation: 
“The Medical Practice Act contains no express prohibition 
on the corporate employment of physicians. Rather, the 
corporate practice of medicine doctrine was inferred from 
the general policies behind the Medical Practice Act. … 
Such a prohibition is entirely appropriate to a general cor- 
poration possessing no licensed authority to offer medical 
services to the public. … However, when a corporation has 
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been sanctioned by the laws of this state to operate a hospi- 
tal, such a prohibition is inapplicable… The foregoing 
statutes clearly authorize, and at all times mandate, li- 
censed hospital corporations to provide medical services. 
We believe that the authority to employ duly-licensed phy- 
sicians for that purpose is reasonably implied from these 
legislative  enactments.”153 
Thus, if an entity wanted to vertically integrate in Illinois, it might 
be able to do so without violating the CPM doctrine. In that state, hospi- 
tals and HMOs can directly employ physicians. In other states, the CPM 
doctrine may be more strictly applied.154 Various strategies may allow an 
entity to achieve the same goal through other means. In California, for ex- 
ample, hospitals may establish medical foundations – which are grounded 
in state law – to buy the assets of physician practices. The foundation con- 
tracts with the physician group and holds the health plan contracts, while a 
professional services agreement ties each party to the other. The medical 
group provides the employment relationship.155 Thus, where the CPM 
doctrine is applicable, alternative approaches may provide a viable path to 
integration. 
However, regardless of whether an entity can take advantage of a 
straightforward exception – or circumnavigate the doctrine through vari- 
ous creative and increasingly burdensome schemes – the CPM doctrine is 
a relic of another era.     To put it in more colorful terms, the doctrine “is a 
remnant of a time when doctors with black bags made house calls, and 
hospitals were a place where people went to be ‘bled’ and to die.”156   
Many commentators have argued that the prohibition against CPM no 
 
 
 
153Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 179 Ill.2d 1, 16-17 (Ill. 1997). 
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word "person" in the physician licensing statute means that a corporation may not practice medicine. Cor- 
porations may not employ licensed professionals to practice medicine.); Gupta v. E. Idaho Tumor Inst.,  
Inc., 140 S.W.3d 747, 752 (Tex. App. 2004) ("Under the Medical Practice Act, when a corporation com- 
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corporation is unlawfully engaged in the practice of medicine."). 
155 Debra A. Draper, Robert A. Berenson, et al., A Tighter Bond: California Hospitals Seek Stronger Ties 
with Physicians, Issue Brief, California Health Care Almanac, Dec. 2009. 
156  Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doc- 
trine, 14 Health Matrix 243, 244 (2004). 
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longer makes sense even in today’s health care construct;157 the doctrine 
certainly should not be applicable to the innovative operations of a verti- 
cally integrated system. 
By prohibiting corporations from employing physicians, the doc- 
trine was designed to protect the physician-patient relationship and ensure 
that the corporation does not inappropriately influence or restrict the phy- 
sician’s judgment. But the doctrine “reaches much farther than delivery of 
medical care; it also relates to payment for medical services, management 
of medical practices, employment and engagement of physicians,    patient 
relations, and more.”158             This could seriously interfere with the operations 
of a thoroughly integrated system. And as some states have recognized,  
the CPM doctrine does not make sense as a blanket prohibition. The most 
straightforward argument against CPM is the existence of a hospital, an 
institution licensed and even required by law to provide medical care for 
patients – what sense does it make to prohibit a hospital from employing 
physicians? In more novel arrangements that may result from vertical in- 
tegration, the CPM doctrine could require entities to set up burdensome 
and complex business structures, adding a tremendous amount of unneces- 
sary cost and imposing constraints that make it more difficult to achieve 
integration and related goals. 
 
3. State Regulatory Approval of Transactions 
 
Another potential obstacle at the state level to vertical integration 
is required regulatory consent or approval of certain corporate transac- 
tions. Most states have requirements that the attorney general be notified  
of a proposed transfer of a non-profit corporation’s assets,159 for example, 
and certain types of transactions require approval of the state attorney gen- 
eral or another regulatory agency.160 States may also require the attorney 
general to work with the state’s Department of Insurance, Department of 
Health, or other administrative agency to grant formal approval to a pro- 
 
 
 
157 See, e.g., Huberfeld, supra note 156; see also Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practice of Medi- 
cine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 Vand L Rev 445 (1987); Adam M. 
Freiman, The Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Injecting a Dose  
of Efficiency Into the Modern Health Care Environment, 47 Emory LJ 697 (1998); Sara Mars, The Corpo- 
rate Practice of Medicine: A Call For Action, 7 Health Matrix 241 (1997). 
158  Huberfeld, supra note 156, at 244-45 (“In increasingly integrated health care delivery systems, the   cor- 
porate practice of medicine doctrine does nothing to improve quality, efficiency, or accountability.”). 
159  See, e.g., Cal Corp Code § 5914 (2003) (California); Gen Laws 1956, § 23-17.14-7 (2013) (Rhode Is- 
land); RC § 109.34 (2014) (Ohio). 
160 Id. 
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posed deal, or else it cannot proceed.161  One state even requires approval  
from all three regulators.162    Obtaining state regulatory approval can delay      
a transaction for months; it can even ultimately derail it, even in the ab-   
sence of any official denial of permission to    proceed.163 
Even if a state grants approval to a transaction, it may require the 
parties seeking approval to meet an onerous list of conditions. For exam- 
ple, in Rhode Island, Prime Healthcare Services – which acquires and 
turns around financially struggling community hospitals – recently sought 
and received approval from the state’s Department of Health to purchase 
facilities on the verge of bankruptcy.164 The Department of Health, how- 
ever, imposed a number of conditions on Prime in its acquisition, from fi- 
nancial commitments to quality benchmarks.165 According to an M&A 
consultant involved in that sale, “it’s not unusual for attorneys general to 
attach conditions to a deal” – and the consultant described Rhode Island’s 
conditions as ‘tame,’ in contrast to the terms imposed in some other states, 
such as New Jersey.166 
In addition, states may have entirely separate requirements to pro- 
vide notice to agencies. Under the Illinois Insurance Code, for example, if 
an insurer proposes the acquisition of a non-insurance entity, such as a 
health care provider, the insurer would not need to seek approval from a 
regulatory agency, but it would be required to notify the DOI at least 30 
days in advance whenever in acquires an ownership interest that exceeds a 
certain  threshold.167    Specifically: 
“The Director shall be notified within 30 days of any in- 
vestment of the domestic insurer in any one corporation if 
the total investment in that corporation by the insurance 
holding company system exceeds 10% of that corporation's 
voting securities.”168 
 
 
 
161  See, e.g., Cal Corp Code § 5914 (2003) (California); Gen Laws 1956, § 23-17.14-7 (2013) (Rhode Is- 
land); RC § 109.34 (2014) (Ohio). 
162 In Wisconsin, parties must obtain approval from the attorney general, the Commissioner of Insurance, 
and the Department of Health and Family Services. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 165.40. 
163 See, e.g., Lindsay Tice, Central Maine Healthcare halts effort to take over Parkview medical center in 
Brunswick, Sun Journal, Oct. 1, 2013 (“Central Maine Healthcare has withdrawn its application ... saying 
state regulators aren’t playing fair and are 'inexplicably but undeniably committed to denying this applica- 
tion.'”). 
164 Beth Kutscher, R.I. slaps conditions on Prime acquisition amid Calif. controversy, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE, Dec. 27, 2013, available at 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20131227/NEWS/312279965/%7B%7BbuttonURL%7D%7D 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 167  215 ILCS 5/131.20a. 
168  215 ILCS 5/131.20a(e). 
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Moreover, if the insurer were acquiring a non-profit hospital, it 
would need to obtain approval from the attorney general, as noted previ- 
ously.169 Other states may have additional or unique notice or approval 
requirements. 
Some states may specifically require a party to obtain a certificate 
of need (“CON”) to build a new health care facility, or even to effect a 
transfer of ownership of such a facility. A CON is an official document 
that a state regulatory agency issues to affirm that there is a legitimate  
need to build or expand a health care facility; the purpose of a requiring a 
CON is to eliminate unnecessary duplication of services.170 These legal 
constructs began to arise in the 1960s, when New York was the first state 
to institute such a process,171 and then became mandatory when Congress 
passed a federal law in 1974 requiring all states to have CON processes in 
place.172 States followed suit, and the federal law was repealed in 1987 – 
as a result, a number of states repealed their own CON statutes.173 A total 
of 36 states still have some form of CON law in place.174 
In Illinois, for example, the Health Facilities Planning Act requires 
parties to obtain a CON to build or expand a health care facility or to ac- 
quire certain equipment.175 The statute states: “No person shall construct, 
modify or establish a health care facility or acquire major medical   equip- 
ment without first obtaining a permit or  exemption  from  the  State 
Board.”176 The State Board referred to here is the Health  Facilities  and 
Service Review Board, created under the Illinois Department of Public 
Health.177 
A large company undertaking a dramatic program of vertical inte- 
gration could elect to either acquire an existing hospital or health system  
or build one from scratch. An insurance company, a retail store (e.g., 
Walgreens, CVS, or Wal-Mart), or any other large corporation going down 
this path, for example, might choose to purchase an existing hospital, since 
it would be entering a new and somewhat unfamiliar line of business. Al- 
ternatively, the company may have sufficient capital (and be    sufficiently 
 
 
169  760 ILCS 55/15.5(a). 
170  41 CJS Hospitals § 8. 
171 Certificate of Need: State Health Laws and Programs, National Conference of State Legislatures, Nov. 
2013, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx (hereinafter 
“NCSL CON laws”). 
172 National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2225. 
173  NCSL CON laws, supra note 172. 
174 Id. 175  20 ILCS 3960/1 (2012). et seq. 
176  20 ILCS 3960/5 (2012). 
177  20 ILCS 3960/3 (2012). 
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bold) to build an attractive and modern brand new facility. In the same 
vein, a large hospital system may want to acquire additional facilities, an 
ambulatory surgery center, or retail clinics to integrate further, or it may 
simply build or expand. 
An acquisition or transfer of ownership might appear to be a more 
straightforward regulatory proposal: the State Board in Illinois is required 
to approve an exemption when the requisite information is submitted.178 A 
change in ownership of a health care facility is expressly listed as a   “pro- 
ject eligible for an exemption” (as opposed to a project requiring a per- 
mit).179 In other states, however, even a simple change of ownership could 
face regulatory hurdles. In New York, the CON application may need to 
receive a recommendation from local health systems agencies (if applica- 
ble), and it must receive a recommendation from the Department of Health 
Staff and the Public Health and Health Planning Council Establishment 
and Project Review Committee.180 After this, the Public  Health  and 
Health Planning Committee makes a final decision to approve or deny the 
CON.181 To construct a new facility in New York, the company would 
have to proceed through all the prior regulatory bodies, and also receive 
approval from the Commissioner of Health.182 These are a lot of hoops 
through which the entity must successfully jump – a costly process for an 
ultimately uncertain outcome. 
One additional question in states that have CON restrictions is that 
of scope: which health care facilities are subject to the requirements? Illi- 
nois, for example, requires a CON permit or exemption for ambulatory 
surgical centers and hospitals, though not for a retail clinic or physician’s 
office.183 Other states may have more regulatory oversight and require  
even entities like retail clinics to satisfy the CON process.184 In states that 
do subject retail clinics to CON scrutiny, they may fail because they do not 
 
 
 
 
 
178  20 ILCS 3960/6(b) (2012). 
179  Id; see also 77 Ill. Adm. Code 1130.410. 
180       The   CON   Process,   Department   of   Health,   New   York   State,   May   2009,   available          at 
http://www.health.ny.gov/facilities/cons/more_information/process.htm. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 183  20 ILCS 3960/3 (2012). 
184 Kentucky, for example, requires a certificate of need for limited service clinics, including retail clinics. 
KRS § 216B.065. Other states similarly impose CON requirements on outpatient facilities; see, e.g., State 
Health Planning & Dev Agency v. Baptist Health System, Inc., 766 So. 2d 176 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (rural 
health clinic); Auburn Med Ctr, Inc. v. East Ala Health Care Auth., 847 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) 
(ambulatory surgical center). 
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provide new services as much as they offer simple existing services in a 
lower-cost  venue.185 
Many have argued that CON laws are inappropriate even in our 
current fragmented health care system, another regulatory relic of a by- 
gone era.186 The CON approval process is inevitably subjective and heav- 
ily political,187 as some projects get approved even when applicants do not 
fully satisfy the CON review criteria or the community still has excess un- 
used capacity,188 while other projects get denied even when the CON re- 
view criteria are fully met or the community genuinely needs additional 
health care services.189 Even the Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission have criticized some states’ CON laws, alleging that they 
“undercut consumer choice, stifle innovation and generally have failed to 
keep health care costs down.”190 State and federal governments are work- 
ing at cross-purposes. 
Regardless of whether CON laws were ever appropriate in a frag- 
mented system of care, they are entirely inappropriate as applied to a verti- 
 
 
185 Kaj Rozga, Retail Health Clinics: How the Next Innovation in Market-Driven Health Care is Testing 
State and Federal Law, 35 Am. J.L. & Med. 205, 216 (2009). 
186 See, e.g., Grant D. Bosse, Irrational: Do Certificate of Need laws reduce costs or hurt patients? Policy 
Matters, Feb. 2012 (arguing that experience has shown that CON laws do not control costs but provide a 
significant barrier to entry to innovative health care facilities and limit competition); Patrick John McGin- 
ley, Beyond Health Care Reform: Reconsidering Certificate of Need Laws in a “Managed Competition” 
System, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 141 (1995) (arguing that the reasons and rationale justifying CON laws no 
longer exists, and that these laws should be repealed); Lowell M. Zeta, Fundamental First Steps Along the 
Road to Health Care Reform: Eliminating the Bureaucratic Burdens of Certificate of Need Programs and 
Embracing Market Competition to Improve State Health Care Systems, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 727 (2008) 
(arguing states should abandon CON regulations because they have failed to control costs and stifled qual- 
ity improvements to health care). 
187  “In its nearly 40-year history, the board has seen more than its share of corruption and political   scandal 
… critics blast the facilities board as a relic of a bygone health care environment that has outlived its use- 
fulness.” Andrew L. Wang, State decisions on Mercy, Centegra renew questions on certificates of need, 
Crain’s Chicago Business, Sept. 13, 2012 available at 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120913/NEWS03/120919878/state-decisions-on-mercy- 
centegra-renew-questions-on-certificates-of-need. 
188 McGuireWoods,      Illinois      Certificate      of      Need:      A      New      Majority      of      Five,  at 
http://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2010/6/Illinois-Certificate-of-Need-A-New- 
Majority-of-Five.aspx (last updated June 2, 2010 ) ("Board members often approve projects even though  
the applicants fail to fully satisfy the CON review criteria. This outcome occurs when enough Board mem- 
bers make a subjective analysis of a project, and for reasons independent of the CON review criteria, decide 
that a project is necessary."). See also Provena Health v. Ill Health Facilities Planning Bd, 382 Ill App 3d 
34, 42 (Ill App 2008) (holding that Board had the authority to issue the CON even though the hospital ap- 
plication did not conform to all of the pertinent review criteria). 
189 See, e.g., Access Ctr for Health, Ltd. v. Ill Health Facilities Planning Bd, 283 Ill App 3d 227 (1996) 
(holding that the Board’s denial of a CON application was not arbitrary and capricious even when it relied 
on a factor which the legislature had not intended the Board to consider, when the record lacked required 
documentation, or when it went against the recommendation of the Department of Public Health). 
190 Amy Lynn Sorrel, Certificate-of-need law in Illinois slammed by feds, AMA, American Medical News, 
Oct. 6, 2008 at http://www.amednews.com/article/20081006/government/310069982/6/ (last updated Oct. 
6, 2008.). 
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cally integrated system. The purpose behind vertical integration as pro- 
posed in this paper is not merely to mash together a payor, a hospital sys- 
tem, and physicians into an amalgamated corporate entity where nothing 
changes other than the ownership – though even if nothing more than this 
took place, it would still be enormously advantageous in aligning financial 
incentives and coordinating better care. Rather, the deeper purpose is once 
these parties (along with many more, such as labs, retail clinics, medical 
device manufacturers, and pharmacies) are joined under a single roof, the 
organization can then (and only then) fundamentally restructure way 
health care is provided and delivered. Patients with different types of di- 
agnostic and treatment needs can be steered into very different types of 
care that operate through entirely different business models. 
The implications of this are that overly simplistic analyses of the 
number of hospital beds in a geographic area are completely irrelevant in 
evaluating the usefulness of a vertically integrated system. Under a CON 
regime, such a system might be blocked from strategic acquisitions or 
from building new facilities because the community has unused “beds” or 
a small group of people, subject to political pressures if not corruption, de- 
termines the community’s needs to be sufficiently met. Yet the benefits of 
vertical integration are incalculable and go far beyond merely providing 
additional services that are essentially more of the same – it would involve 
providing these services in a new way, and providing new and unprece- 
dented services that did not previously exist. 
 
4. State Insurance Laws 
 
State regulators impose benefit mandates on health insurance issu- 
ers, requiring them to cover either specific services or certain underlying 
conditions or diagnoses. For example, Illinois requires coverage for the 
inpatient treatment of alcoholism,191 the diagnosis and treatment of autism 
spectrum disorders for individuals under age 21,192 and all outpatient con- 
traceptive services, drugs and devices approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration.193    Illinois has several dozen such benefit mandates, and it    
is far from  atypical in  this regard.194     In  all 50  states, there  may  be   more 
 
 
 
191  215 ILCS 5/367(7) (2012). 
192  215 ILCS 5/356z.14 (2012). 
193  215 ILCS 5/356z.4; 215 ILCS 125/5-3 (2012). 
194 Mandated Benefits, Offers, and Coverages for Accident & Health Insurance and HMOs, Illinois De- 
partment of Insurance, at http://insurance.illinois.gov/HealthInsurance/Mandated_benefits.asp (last updated 
Jan. 2012). 
	   
 
 
104 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW           [VOL. 17.2:65 
 
than 2,200 such statutory benefit mandates.195  The federal government, 
too, has established minimum requirements for a more comprehensive 
health insurance product in certain market segments. The Affordable Care 
Act sets forth ten mandatory categories in its “essential health benefits” 
requirements;196   the  relevant  regulations  establish  a  baseline  but  defer  to 
states to create an essential health benefits package, for which all non- 
grandfathered individual and small group policies must provide  cover-  
age.197 
Furthermore, under both state and federal laws, insurers must pro- 
vide myriad notices and explanations of benefits to consumers,198 offer 
adequate provider networks,199 provide rebates when their medical loss ra- 
tio is below a certain threshold,200 establish processes governing internal 
claims and appeals and external review,201 and so forth. Implicit assump- 
tions and policy goals underlie these laws: legislators’ and regulators’ con- 
cerns include ensuring consumers receive due process in appealing claims, 
accurate claim adjudication, an expansive and liberal view of benefit de- 
terminations, ensuring consumers have sufficient information to make in- 
formed decisions, limiting corporate profits, insolvency, and keeping in- 
surance premiums low, among other things. The overarching theme seems 
to be protecting consumers. 
To take health insurance benefit mandates as a particular example 
of a problematic regulation: the difficulty is that they are set in stone and 
frozen in place, while technology and business models are fluid. This is a 
problem even in the disjointed health care system we have today – but it is 
less of a problem, because the system’s patchwork nature assures that 
business models will generally be static and will not change rapidly. An 
integrated system, on the other hand, has the power and scope to scrap 
older technology and outdated business models and to implement brand 
new ones, and benefit mandates are therefore a weighty albatross. 
A more concrete example may help clarify this point: today, stand- 
alone hospitals provide inpatient care, but they are monumental and ex- 
 
 
195 State Health Insurance Mandates and the ACA Essential Benefits Provisions, National Conference of 
State Legislatures,, at http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-ins-mandates-and-aca-essential- 
benefits.aspx (last updated Jan. 2, 2014). 
196  42 USC § 300gg-6(a) (2006). 
197  45 CFR § 156.100 (2013) et seq. 
198 See, e.g., 26 USC § 4980B and 26 CFR § 54.4980B–1 to B-8 (requirements to provide COBRA notices 
of continuation of coverage); 42 USC 300gg-15 and 45 CFR 147.200 (requirements to provide summaries 
of benefits and coverage under the Affordable Care Act); 29 USC § 1133(1) and 29 CFR § 2560.503– 
1(g)(1) (requirements to provide explanations of benefits for any adverse benefit determination). 
199  50 Ill. Adm. Code 2051.310. 
200  42 USC 300gg-18 (2006); 45 CFR Part 158 (2013). 
201  42 USC 300gg-19 (2006); 45 CFR § 147.136 (2013). 
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traordinarily expensive physical structures with enormous inertia. They 
have a business model that is dependent on filling beds to the greatest ex- 
tent possible and maximizing their reimbursement for doing so. To the ex- 
tent new technology allows for a shift away from inpatient beds to outpa- 
tient care, or to a physician’s office, the hospital would naturally resist; 
this fragment of the system has ossified. Similarly, new technology could 
ensure greater reliability and safer results for a given procedure, allowing 
for a shift away from highly trained expert physicians to health care pro- 
fessionals with less extensive training, or even to patient self-care at home 
(e.g., blood glucose monitoring equipment and insulin injections, which 
patients with diabetes self-administer). When technology permits bypass- 
ing physicians, physicians would naturally resist. Laws that require a pa- 
tient to continue receiving care through an expensive venue mean that 
new, innovative, less expensive technology will wither or be absorbed into 
the more expensive venue. 
Insurance benefit mandates require coverage for specific services, 
sometimes in specific settings by specific professionals. In a fragmented 
system, requiring insurance coverage for expensive inpatient hospital care 
when a patient could otherwise be safely and effectively treated in an out- 
patient setting – or requiring a physician provide care when a nurse practi- 
tioner or trained technician could safely and effectively do the same  thing 
– increases overall costs and slows down or destroys innovation. But these 
mandates at least make some sense when a lot of isolated players are de- 
fending the status quo and preventing business model innovation anyway. 
In an integrated system, such mandates constitute shackles on the ability to 
restructure the way care is provided, which could otherwise lower costs, 
while improving both access and quality.  The vertically integrated system 
– consisting of large hospitals, outpatient surgery centers, physician of- 
fices, retail clinics, pharmacies, and so forth – is free to steer patients away 
from more expensive venues of care and towards less expensive venues 
whenever it is clinically justifiable and rational to do so. The entity has no 
bias toward filling hospital beds or maximizing physician services. Such 
regulations impose an undue burden on the integrated entity, diluting its 
potential consumer benefits. 
Other laws that govern insurers specifically exist to protect or ben- 
efit providers. States often have prompt pay laws, for example, which re- 
quire that when a provider submits a ‘clean claim’ to a health insurance 
company, the insurer must pay the provider within a specified amount    of 
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time, such as 30 or 45 days.202 If an insurer fails to pay in a timely man- 
ner, it is subject to penalties, which are generally paid either to the pro- 
vider or to the state.203 The underlying policy goal here is to protect pro- 
viders and ensure quick and full payment of claims. Several instances of 
delayed payments from insurers arguably make the case that these re- 
quirements are necessary.204  What’s unusual about these laws is that this  
is a straightforward arms-length transaction, and laws mandating a buyer 
(of any goods or services) pay a seller within a certain period of time are 
rare or nonexistent in almost any other industry. This is generally a con- 
tractual issue that private parties negotiate and agree to. Insurers are a 
special case who apparently cannot be trusted to pay in a reasonable period 
of time without an additional legal obligation. 
Prompt pay requirements do not necessarily make sense even in 
the current system; there is no reason to treat insurers differently from any 
other business that purchases services. And even proponents of these laws 
concede that they are inadequate and largely ineffective.205,206         But they 
almost inevitably must exist in our fragmented regulatory landscape; 
prompt pay is one of many attempts to referee the ongoing game between 
insurers and providers. 
However, in a closed and vertically integrated system, the payor 
and all relevant providers are housed under one roof. Any physicians or 
other health care professionals are simply on staff as employees and are 
paid an hourly wage or an annual salary, or some other typical compensa- 
tion structure. The concern behind prompt pay laws – insurers refusing to 
pay or delaying payment to providers, pending claims, etc. – simply evap- 
orates. 
Unfortunately, the situation is not quite this simple; it is not the 
case that prompt pay laws are simply inapplicable to an integrated payor- 
provider system, i.e., that they are merely superfluous but do no real harm. 
Rather, these laws could actively interfere with the operations and benefits 
of such a system. No matter how closed and integrated the system is, 
“leakage” will always exist.        Members would still occasionally need to 
 
 
202  215 ILCS 5/368a. (2012). 
203 Id. 204 See, e.g., Susan Laccetti Meyers, Insurers Fined $400,000 for Tardy Pay, Atlanta J. & Const., Jan. 25, 
2002, at 1F. 
205  Michael Flynn, The Check Isn't In the Mail: The Inadequacy of State Prompt Pay Statutes, 10 DEPAUL 
J HEALTH CARE L 397, 407. 411 (2007) (“[T]his legislative solution [prompt pay statutes] is far from 
perfect. In fact, Prompt Pay statutes and regulations spawn more squabbles, pitting doctors against HMOs 
who quickly blame trial lawyers…”) 
206  Id at 411 (““…[S]statistics continue to show that health care providers are still not paid in a timely man- 
ner.”). 
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visit providers that are outside of the closed system, such as in an emer- 
gency or when the system lacks a particularly appropriate specialist, and it 
would then need to reimburse the provider. To this extent, prompt pay  
laws would still apply. Yet we are no longer dealing with the same entity; 
the game has changed, and it is not an isolated insurer but rather a thor- 
oughly integrated health care delivery system making these payments.   
The concerns behind insurers’ perceived tactics are not present, yet the re- 
strictions would apply and the vertically integrated system would have to 
comply with antiquated and burdensome regulations or face steep financial 
penalties.207 
One final example of state insurance regulation is “any willing 
provider” laws, which require managed care organizations and insurers to 
grant network participation to health care providers willing to join and 
meet network requirements.208 From the perspective of the insurer, these 
laws restrict the insurers’ ability to use a closed panel of physicians, hospi- 
tals, or other providers. Proponents of any willing provider laws – includ- 
ing many physicians – argue that these laws prevent discrimination against 
particular providers, and they protect the patient-physician relationship by 
safeguarding the patient’s freedom of choice.209   Opponents of these  laws 
– including many HMOs and insurers – argue that these laws restrict their 
ability to freely contract, and that they therefore are prevented from lower- 
ing cost or improving quality.210 
Illinois, for example, has two such laws; one is applicable to non- 
institutional health care providers, and the other is applicable to pharma- 
cies.211, 212 In either case, a health insurance issuer or third party adminis- 
trator may not refuse to contract with any provider or pharmacy that meets  
the plan’s terms and conditions. Several considerations follow from these  
laws in Illinois. First, they do not require contracting with institutional 
providers, such as hospitals. Second, even where the any willing provider  
laws do apply, the insurer or third party administrator may offer different 
levels of reimbursement as an incentive or disincentive for individual pro- 
 
 
207 Some would even argue that payors should be subject to additional risk and liability: see, e.g., Monica E. 
Nussbaum, Prompt Pay Statutes Should Be Interpreted to Grant Providers a Private Right of Action to Seek 
Enforcement Against Payors, 15 HEALTH MATRIX  205 (2005). 
208 Ashley Noble, Any Willing or Authorized Providers, National Conference of State Legislatures, avail- 
able at http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/any-willing-or-authorized-providers.aspx (last updated Nov. 5, 
2014). 
209 William J. Bahr, Although Offering More Freedom to Choose, “Any Willing Provider” Legislation is the 
Wrong Choice, 45 U.KAN.L.REV 557, 570 (1997). 
210 Id. 211  215 ILCS 5/370h (2014). 
212  215 ILCS 134/72(a) (2014). 
	   
 
 
108 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH   CARE LAW [VOL. 17.2:65 
 
viders or pharmacies. This allows the health plan to maintain some degree 
of control over its networks. 
In many ways, the any willing provider laws are similar to prompt 
pay laws discussed above: in the context of a vertically integrated system, 
neither of these regulatory constructs makes sense. A closed, integrated 
system would generally acquire and employ individual health care profes- 
sionals, from physicians to pharmacists, as opposed to contracting with 
providers – yet the any willing provider laws speak only of contracting.   
To a large extent these laws would have no meaning. Again, however, the 
analysis does not end here. 
The payor-provider system could not become thoroughly inte- 
grated and completely closed overnight – it would need to go about a stra- 
tegic series of acquisitions and mergers that would take many years, if not 
decades. In the meantime, it may still need to contract with a number of 
different types of providers. Furthermore, to the extent that there is “leak- 
age” and the system cannot be 100 percent closed, it would need to con- 
tinue contracting with certain providers to ensure all of  its  members’ 
health care needs are fully met. However, any willing provider laws stem 
from the assumption that the way care is delivered currently is optimal, 
and the problem to be solved is simply eliminating potential discrimination 
among providers and ensuring freedom of choice for patients. The diffi- 
culty is that one of the main reasons for vertically integrating is to restruc- 
ture and optimize the way care is provided. The ideal delivery system 
might consist of very few hospitals and a large number of retail clinics, for 
example. Requiring this type of innovative system to contract with every 
willing provider is troublesome and unhelpful. 
These laws and many others in this regulatory framework are il- 
logical with respect to a vertically integrated entity. An integrated payor- 
provider system is fundamentally different from two parties dealing at 
arm’s length. There is no more reason to think such a system would with- 
hold or delay payment to its employees (whether physicians or any other 
individual health care professional) than any other business would. Like- 
wise, there would be no reason to assume it might pay providers too little 
or provide too few services for enrollees. The policy concerns behind 
many of the existing laws and ‘protections’ – even if arguably rational and 
necessary in the gloom of the current fragmented health care  environment 
– vanish in the light of a completely integrated system. 
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C. Business Considerations 
1. Legal Corporate Structure 
 
Beyond state and federal laws and regulations, vertical integration 
raises a host of quasi-legal business considerations. The most obvious and 
immediate consideration is that of legal structure: what form should the 
organization take? Should it ultimately be a single colossal corporate en- 
tity with a single board of directors overseeing everything? Or would it 
function better as separate interrelated and mutually dependent entities, 
each with its own board of directors? If separate, should the board of di- 
rectors partially or completely overlap? 
These are not just academic or theoretical questions. Other health 
care systems that have taken steps toward integration have faced these is- 
sues, and to a great extent state law may constrain their ultimate corporate 
form – and with it, their potential to integrate and achieve efficiencies. 
For example, the Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program (“Kai- 
ser”) is one of the most well-known payor-provider systems. Upon closer 
inspection, Kaiser actually consists of three separate entities that cooperate 
under  mutually  exclusive  contracts.213      The  Kaiser  Foundation Health 
Plan, a nonprofit corporation, contracts with individual, group, and public 
purchasers of coverage to finance care, effectively operating as an insurer 
or payor.214 Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, another nonprofit corporation, 
arranges for inpatient, extended, and home health care for health plan 
members in owned or contracted facilities.215 It owns and operates 35 
medical centers (hospitals with multi-specialty outpatient and ancillary 
services) in several states, as well as 431 outpatient medical office build- 
ings to provide primary care, lab, radiology, and pharmacy services.216  
The health plan and the hospital system share a common board of direc- 
tors,217 which may give it a stronger and more cohesive governance struc- 
ture for unified operations and decision-making authority.218 Finally, the 
Permanente Medical Group consists of multi-specialty groups of physi- 
 
 
213 Douglas McCarthy, Kimberly Mueller, and Jennifer Wrenn, Kaiser Permanente: Bridging the Quality 
Divide with Integrated Practice, Group Accountability, and Health Information Technology, Case Study, 
The Commonwealth Fund, Jun. 2009. 
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217 Id. 218 See L R Burns, J Cacciamani, et al., The Fall of the House of AHERF: The Allegheny Bankruptcy, 19 
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cians who accept a fixed payment to provide medical care exclusively for 
Kaiser health plan members in Kaiser facilities.219 The reason for this tri- 
partite organizational structure is that California follows the corporate 
practice of medicine doctrine and prohibits the direct employment of  phy- 
sicians. In order to achieve some degree of integration, Kaiser therefore  
set up foundations, which contract with the separate medical group. 
Another example of California law impacting a corporate structure 
is the United Health Care acquisition of a physician group in recent years. 
United Optum, a division of United Health Care, purchased the    manage- 
ment arm of Monarch HealthCare, an association in southern California of 
approximately 2,300 physicians practicing in a range of specialties.220 Op- 
tum could not purchase and employ the physician group, again because of 
the corporate practice of medicine doctrine: rules in California prevent 
most entities from directly employing physicians.221 Instead, a company 
like this “might buy non-clinical assets and sign a long-term management 
agreement with an independent practice association of physicians such as 
Monarch.”222 It is important to note, for purposes of this paper, that this is 
far from complete vertical integration – it is not even an exclusive con- 
tract. The physicians that Optum acquired “will not work exclusively with 
United's health plan, and will continue to contract with an array of insur- 
ers.”223 However, this demonstrates the unnecessary restrictions that state 
law can impose on an entity wishing to undergo even a relatively simple 
acquisition. 
One of the few parties taking steps toward vertical integration at 
this time is Highmark, a health insurance company in Pennsylvania. In a 
recent transaction, Highmark acquired West Penn Allegheny Health Sys- 
tem (“West Penn”), a troubled hospital system, for just over $600 mil- 
lion.224 Highmark additionally invested about $475 million in the system, 
bringing the total cost closer to $1.1 billion.225 This is a relatively large 
transaction and represents an initial step toward integration, even if only 
between a single insurer and hospital system. The corporate structure of 
the new entity will consist of a parent company called Highmark and sub- 
sidiaries that include an insurance company and Allegheny Health Net- 
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work (consisting of numerous providers, including West Penn).226 Unlike 
in some other states, Pennsylvania law may allow for more flexibility in 
employment of physicians.227 However, the Pennsylvania insurance de- 
partment imposed conditions on the acquisition, including a clause limit- 
ing contracts between Highmark and hospitals (including West Penn) to 
five years; a prohibition on exclusive contracts that would benefit West 
Penn; and a firewall to prevent Highmark and West Penn from sharing ri- 
vals’ pricing information.228 
A vertically integrated payor-provider system could be structured 
in myriad ways. Depending on the jurisdiction, however, state laws may 
seriously constrain the permissible corporate forms and restrict the sys- 
tem’s options. The result of this can be a loosely knit organization requir- 
ing foundations, parent companies or holding companies, or other incorpo- 
real inventions solely to comply with laws and regulations that no longer 
make sense. 
If this were all, it might be a distinction without a difference. But 
more critically, such a cumbersome and disjointed structure may not allow 
for genuine integration of the payor, the hospital and other health care fa- 
cilities, the medical groups, and other types of providers in a way that 
achieves maximum efficiencies and optimizes cost, quality of care, and 
access. For example, when an insurer or a hospital enters into a manage- 
ment agreement with a physician group, such as Optum did with Monarch 
in California, the physician group is generally paid a lump sum and an in- 
centive payment or bonus that depends on meeting certain quality and  pa- 
tient  satisfaction  metrics.229      These  remain  two  isolated  parties   entering 
into a contractual arrangement; it is no different than the agreement insur- 
ers frequently establish with physician groups (e.g., independent practice 
associations or IPAs) on a capitated basis. No real integration has oc- 
curred with this type of setup. Similarly, by structuring the new health 
system as separate corporate entities (parent and subsidiaries), Highmark 
has created an entity that may appear to be “integrated” superficially, but 
is really an extension of the old fragmented system and will be regulated  
as such.       In the state regulators’ view, West Penn appears to be just one 
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more hospital with whom Highmark (as a payor) contracts. This will re- 
strict the system’s ability to restructure the way care is provided. 
 
2. The Costly Consequences of Fragmentation 
 
The highly fragmented nature of the current health care system –  
in particular, the schism between insurance companies and health care 
providers – creates a problem of “moral hazard.” Generally, moral hazard 
is the tendency of an individual to behave differently based on the pres- 
ence of insurance.230 The principle of moral hazard in health care means 
individuals tend to increase utilization of medical services that their insur- 
ance pays for – in other words, as insurance coverage increases, demand 
for covered services increases.231 
Moral hazard manifests itself in a fragmented health care system in 
the following way: public demand for the newest, sleekest hospitals with 
private rooms, luxurious accommodations, and the most advanced tech- 
nology fuels providers to spend great sums of money building these facili- 
ties to attract patients. In a typical example, in 2009, the Children’s Hos- 
pital of Pittsburgh moved from an older downtown facility to a 10-acre site 
just a few miles away.232    The new hospital and adjacent research   center 
exceeded expected costs, reaching $625 million. The nonprofit parent, 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, complained that  Children’s  
spending plans were too lavish.233  One  hospital  executive  boasted,  “We 
went from a Yugo to a Ferrari.”234 In Illinois, a new tower for the Reha- 
bilitation Institute of Chicago will cost an  estimated  $523  million,  as  of 
Feb. 2012, up ten percent from estimates just one month prior.235 
Similarly, in the southwest suburbs of Chicago, Silver Cross Hos- 
pital recently moved its operations from its aging facilities in Joliet (origi- 
nally built in 1919) to a brand new sprawling complex in New Lenox, 
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where the hospital alone covers 560,000 square feet.236 The total price tag 
was $395 million, but “officials said that it would have cost more to up- 
date the old building than to simply build the new facility.”237 The new 
hospital is only three miles away from the old one, but the location will 
likely make a huge difference in terms of the payer mix that the hospital 
sees. The old facility was located in an area of Joliet with a lower socio- 
economic status, a higher rate of poverty, and more patients who are unin- 
sured or on Medicaid.  The new Silver Cross complex is in a more affluent 
area where more people have commercial insurance coverage. Further- 
more, it sits at the junction of two large expressways that will make the 
hospital easily accessible from surrounding, more affluent suburbs. Thus,  
it may be true that building a new facility was less expensive than updating 
the old hospital, but its new location serves the purpose of increasing profit 
as well. 
Hospitals or other facilities built nearly a century ago certainly 
need to eventually be updated, if not completely replaced, and the expense 
in doing so may be justifiably high. But more hospitals are not necessarily 
what patients need today. Moreover, increasingly luxurious environments 
are constructed in order to attract more customers. For example, Silver 
Cross officials emphasized its hospital’s latest amenities, “such as private 
rooms with large windows and flat-screen TVs.”238    The hospital is    also 
equipped with wi-fi and other technology; each private room has its own 
temperature controls and sleeper sofas for family. The hospital’s vice 
president of operations commented that the “rooms are so nice that people 
are going to find it hard to go home.”239   While statements like this contain 
some degree of hyperbole, they also offer a glimpse into the real reasons 
behind health care spending today. 
Whether for-profit or non-profit, health care providers of all types 
are businesses operating in a capitalist economy, and they must make more 
money than they spend in order to keep the doors open and the lights on. 
To have positive revenue, they need to attract more patients, particularly 
those with private health insurance coverage, which pays them the highest 
in reimbursement. And in order to attract such patients, these facilities 
need to be state of the art with luxurious accommodations. Yet this is 
where the problem of moral hazard takes its grievous toll – from a pa- 
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tient’s perspective, as long as she has already paid her insurance premi- 
ums, some or all of the cost of the medical services will be covered, and 
she will be cushioned against bearing the full expense. Health care pro- 
viders are generally catering to customers who are largely or completely 
immune to cost. 
Hospitals are only one part of our deeply fragmented health care 
system, but they are a useful microcosm of its problems. The regulatory 
framework in health care continually reinforces the system’s structure.  
The more that regulators define the players in the system (insurer, hospital, 
ambulatory surgery center, pharmacy, etc.) and draw sharp distinctions be- 
tween them – the more they precisely delineate the scope of what each can 
and cannot do – the further regulators cement these categories as perma- 
nent and create incentives to maximize income within each category. In- 
surers try to reduce costs and negotiate more favorable reimbursement 
rates with providers. Providers in turn try to do the same thing and end up 
at loggerheads with insurers. The regulatory framework evolved over time 
to mirror the fragmented system, but it has had the unintended effect of 
crystallizing the system’s disintegration. Each isolated entity in this envi- 
ronment lacks the financial incentives to do anything but maximize its own 
profits and lacks the clout to reinvent the entire structure. 
A vertically integrated system has the potential to circumnavigate 
this problem. There is no third party payor in such a system. One entity 
both finances and delivers care; the financial incentives of all parties are 
aligned. This is not to say that any integrated system would automatically 
reorganize the entire health care system’s architecture; it could simply 
continue operating as if nothing changed other than ownership. For exam- 
ple, Intermountain Health Care, a large integrated health care delivery sys- 
tem in Utah, recently constructed an enormously expensive brand new 
hospital.240 Intermountain did not restructure anything, but rather, contin- 
ued down the same path as other non-integrated entities. Integration is no 
guarantee of disruption to the existing system. However, complete vertical 
integration is a prerequisite and only such a system would have the ability 
to undertake this dramatic shakeup. 
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III. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The laws and regulations discussed in this paper, along with nu- 
merous others, would need to be carefully considered in the planning and 
implementation of any health care vertical integration strategy. Individu- 
ally, these laws may make sense and address valid concerns in the present 
disjointed health care system (although in many cases, even that is debat- 
able). In the aggregate, however, they clearly represent a byzantine regu- 
latory framework that may be extraordinarily difficult for a single entity to 
successfully navigate. More importantly, this framework is entirely inap- 
propriate as applied to a vertically integrated entity. 
It is often said that if the only tool you have is a hammer, every- 
thing looks like a nail.241 Likewise, to a legislator or regulator, all prob- 
lems appear to have a solution in additional legislation or regulation. To  
be clear, this paper is not making the case that all regulation is   inherently 
bad. In certain situations, governmental intervention is absolutely neces- 
sary and serves an important role where the market would otherwise fail or 
leave a gap. And as noted above, some of the regulations in the current 
fragmented health care system may be appropriate or even essential to 
such a system. However, a thoroughly integrated payor-provider system 
has the potential to change the health care landscape and transform the 
way care is provided. The financial incentives of all parties in such a sys- 
tem are internally coherent and aligned, a situation that is completely dif- 
ferent from the disparate and conflicting incentives that isolated entities 
experience. In the bright light of such a new system, many of the concerns 
underlying health care laws melt away. A regulatory framework erected 
decades ago in a very different era unnecessarily sets up major obstacles to 
vertical integration, discouraging the very policy goals that policymakers 
were at one time trying to achieve. 
At the outset, this paper suggested that it would propose what the 
ideal regulatory framework might look like, as it relates to an integrated 
delivery system. In short, the answer is that such a system would be sub- 
ject to far less health care- or health insurance- specific regulation. Legis- 
lators and regulators should carve out and exempt an integrated payor- 
provider system from the most burdensome and inappropriate pieces of the 
regulatory framework, for at least two reasons. 
First, even in the absence of healthcare-specific regulation, an 
abundance of employment laws would already govern the integrated   sys- 
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tem and would be sufficient to appropriately address most policy concerns. 
The payor-provider system must comply with wage and hour laws under      
the Fair Labor Standards Act242 and its regulations; workplace safety re- 
quirements under the Occupational Safety and Health Act243 and its regula- 
tions; workplace  discrimination  and  harassment  statutes  including  Title  
VII of the Civil Rights Act,244  the Family and Medical Leave Act,245  and  
legal or professional  standards  involving  everything  from  workplace  torts 
to medical staff issues like credentialing and privileges.246    To the extent     
the business offers any employee benefit plans, such as pension or health 
benefit plans, it must comply with the Employee Retirement Income Secu-  
rity Act (“ERISA”)247 and its regulations, as well as the Internal Revenue  
Code (“IRC”)248 and its regulations – at least, to the extent ERISA and the 
IRC are generally applicable to most businesses or plans, since they too 
contain health care regulation. Social Security Act rules would also still 
apply.249 Many state laws govern employers, as well.250 This is not an ex- 
haustive list of laws applicable to employers, but just a few examples. 
The absence of healthcare-specific regulation would not mean the 
absence of any regulation: employment law, well-developed over many 
decades and equally applicable to most employers, would suffice to govern 
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the entity and its operations. As one illustration, wage and hour laws are 
unquestionably appropriate for a system that employs physicians, nurses, 
and other health care professionals as common law employees. To the ex- 
tent any concerns arise, they would typically be concerns common to em- 
ployment generally. Many convoluted and antiquated healthcare-specific 
laws like Stark or anti-kickback, or doctrines such as the corporate practice 
of medicine, are inapplicable to an integrated system at best and are seri- 
ous hindrances to it at worst. 
Antitrust laws are a special case, for purposes of this argument. 
They are the only regulatory framework discussed in this paper that are 
generally applicable to any industry and that do not exclusively target 
health care entities. However, for the reasons outlined above, these laws 
could nevertheless pose major obstacles to integration in the health care 
arena. Regulators should therefore grant a safe harbor or exemption to an 
integrated payor-provider system and to entities attempting to create one. 
This would not be without precedent. The Affordable Care Act in- 
cluded a health care delivery system reform, the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program, which promotes the formation and operation of Accountable 
Care Organizations (“ACOs”).251   ACOs are groups of providers that work 
together to coordinate care, in this case for Medicare beneficiaries. In 
general, a payor provides the ACO with a lump sum payment and the par- 
ties in the ACO figure out how to divide it up among themselves; to the 
extent they can provide care more efficiently and save money, the ACO 
shares in the savings. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) are the agencies responsible for enforcing an- 
titrust laws, and since ACOs might otherwise trigger violations of these 
laws, the DOJ and FTC have issued a policy statement providing an anti- 
trust safety zone for ACOs that meet certain criteria.252 The DOJ and FTC 
assert in this statement that absent extraordinary circumstances, they will 
not challenge ACOs that fall into this safety zone.253 Interestingly, the 
policy statement specifically does not apply to “single, fully integrated en- 
tities.”254 Clearly, it is within the agencies’ discretion and power to carve 
out certain entities whose effect on competition is likely to be beneficial, 
particularly when there are demonstrable and significant benefits to    con- 
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sumers. The agencies can and should create a broader safe harbor for fully 
integrated  entities,  as well.255 
Policymakers should mirror this approach for fully integrated 
health care systems in certain other areas of the law. Such a system could 
be given an exemption or safe harbor from both Stark and anti-kickback.   
It could also be exempted from the corporate practice of medicine doctrine 
and certificate of need requirements. These laws and regulations were 
never developed for a thoroughly integrated entity; they arose out of con- 
cerns inherent in a fragmented health care delivery system. A number of 
state health care or health insurance laws and regulations, such as prompt 
pay requirements, should also be considered inapplicable to such an entity. 
As explained above, many of these mandates are understandable when 
providers and payors are two separate entities with distinct, sometimes 
conflicting economic interests. But when applied to an economically and 
managerially integrated system, these requirements are puzzling, as the 
policy concerns that formed their foundation suddenly disappear. Why 
would an integrated delivery system that employs health care professionals 
need special laws ordering them to pay their employees in a timely man- 
ner? Similar arguments could be advanced about numerous other regula- 
tions. 
Thus, employment law would be sufficient in most cases to govern 
the integrated system, and additional regulation would be unnecessary.  
But second, and perhaps more importantly, health care entities today need 
room to maneuver and to begin preparations to vertically integrate. They 
need some degree of freedom to act without encountering intense and bur- 
densome regulatory scrutiny every step of the way. And once formed and 
operating as a cohesive whole, the system needs room to breathe, expand, 
innovate, and experiment. If it hits up against a regulatory obstacle at 
every turn, its ability to transform health care delivery will be seriously 
constrained, and the benefits of such a system will be limited. In short, an 
integrated system needs some elbow room. 
This is not to say that an overarching regulatory framework would 
be unnecessary. To the extent one is needed, though, it should be con- 
structed around existing businesses and industries, after they come into ex- 
istence – not before. It does not make sense to erect a rigid framework of 
regulation before the industry it governs exists or while it is in an embry- 
onic stage. Nor does it make sense to erect it based on one existing indus- 
try and then expect a brand new disruptive business model to neatly fit and 
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operate successfully within it. A colossal, thoroughly integrated health 
care financing and delivery system may pose special or unique problems 
that actually do require innovative regulatory solutions; this remains to be 
seen. But any such concerns are merely speculative at this point because 
such a system does not exist. 
That any optimal solutions will even lie in legislation is far from 
clear. Clark Havighurst, law professor and an expert on health care law 
and policy, provides the most suitable concluding thoughts for this paper: 
Regulation will frequently seem advantageous because it is 
measured only against the alternative of doing nothing, not 
against other promising policies that might have been, but 
were not, tried. Indeed, when adopted at the national level, 
regulation forecloses experimentation, not only making 
success or failure hard to recognize but also making the 
optimum  strategy  undiscoverable.256 
If a genuinely integrated system poses any novel problems, there 
may be a fair and extensive debate about whether additional regulation is 
the best solution. But even if the answers do ultimately reside in regula- 
tion, the current framework is singularly inappropriate. It was built 
piecemeal and in a haphazard fashion over many decades and with many 
different purposes in mind. The current regulatory landscape includes  
some awkward and circuitous rivers, misguided and overgrown branches, 
petrified trees, occasional patches of quicksand, and massively obstructive 
mountains. With the emergence of an innovative integrated system, this 
landscape must be cleared away and transformed. 
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